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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that A has sex with B, and that one of the following is also true: 
(1) A has sex with B because B pays A to have sex with B. 
(2) A has sex with B because a third party pays A and B to have sex with 
each other in order to make a pornographic picture or film. 
If (1) is true, then A has committed the crime of prostitution. If (2) is true, 
then (in many jurisdictions) A has not committed the crime of prostitution. 
This seems strange. A has engaged in exactly the same physical 
movements in both cases, with the same intent—A had sex with B 
intentionally. In both cases, A has done so for money. In neither case is there 
any reason to think A was motivated by desire or arousal or personal pleasure 
of any sort; in neither case is there any reason to think A felt love or affection 
or any sort of personal connection to B.1 In both cases, A’s conduct might be 
described as acting or as a performance.2 Indeed, it is not unreasonable to 
suspect in both cases that A has engaged in this behavior unhappily, under 
conditions of deprivation and limited choice, with a background of serious 
personal suffering.3 As far as anyone can tell, then, A has done the same 
 
 1. The dominant and heavily supported view is that those who engage in these behaviors do 
not feel personal connections with their partners or take any pleasure in these activities. See, e.g., 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Trafficking, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 993, 995–96 (2005) 
[hereinafter MacKinnon, Pornography] (those who participate in pornography “say they usually 
feel nothing sexually . . . with someone they have no sexual interest in[] doing things that do 
nothing for them sexually”); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Trafficking, Prostitution, and Inequality, 
46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 294 n.81 (2011) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Trafficking] (noting 
research showing that prostitutes neither enjoy nor recommend prostitution and that “going to bed 
with a customer is a joyless, even distasteful, experience”). There are, however, some conflicting 
reports. For example, some prostitutes report taking satisfaction in therapeutic or caretaking 
aspects of their interactions with some clients. Others report experiencing sexual pleasure in acts 
of prostitution. See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Sex Work/Sex Act: Law, Labor, and Desire in 
Constructions of Prostitution, 22 SIGNS 277, 299 (1997) (briefly discussing literature containing 
such reports); Elizabeth Bernstein, What’s Wrong With Prostitution? What’s Right With Sex 
Work? Comparing Markets in Female Sexual Labor, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 91, 97 (1999) 
(discussing “pro-sex feminis[t]” defenses of prostitution, which include reports from prostitutes 
who claim to experience excitement, adventure, and power in performing prostitution). Such 
conflicting reports may be attributed to false consciousness or other sorts of motivated delusion, 
though such attribution itself may risk disrespecting those who claim these experiences. See Zatz, 
supra, at 296 n.19. 
 2. Noah Zatz observes that prostitutes not uncommonly characterize their conduct as a 
performance, and he highlights that this raises interesting questions about the relationship 
between prostitution and “more explicitly performance-oriented sex work such as live sex shows 
and photographic pornography.” Zatz, supra note 1, at 284 n.12. 
 3. There is an enormous body of research and literature documenting that prostitutes are 
typically unhappy, work under conditions of deprivation and limited choice, and come from 
backgrounds involving abuse, poverty, addiction, and other sources of personal suffering. See, 
e.g., MacKinnon, Trafficking, supra note 1, at 273–74 (“[T]he sexual exploitation approach sees 
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things, with the same intents and motives and feelings, for the same reasons, 
and under the same background conditions, in (1) and (2). If so, it is strange 
that (1) is prostitution but (2) is not.4 
 
prostitution as the oldest oppression. . . . [W]omen in prostitution are observed to be prostituted 
through choices precluded, options restricted, possibilities denied. . . . Prostitution . . . is observed 
to be a product of lack of choice;” it is “an economic sector of sexual abuse . . . a practice of serial 
rape.”); id. at 276–79 (“[P]rostituted people are overwhelmingly poor . . . . Urgent financial need 
is the most frequent reason mentioned by people in prostitution for being in the sex trade;” they 
are “members of socially disadvantaged racial groups or lower castes;” “people typically enter 
prostitution when they are young, often well below the age of majority;” “sexual abuse in 
childhood . . . is a major precondition.”); Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal 
Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 827–28 (1998) (“Many feminists believe that 
prostitution is generally a form of economically coerced sex. . . . [Some depicting] the average 
prostitute as a teenage runaway who later suffers psychological and physical abuse at the hands of 
pimps, police, and customers. Studies also indicate that, as children, prostitutes are often victims 
of incest. The legacy of this childhood victimization may be that, as adults, prostitutes are 
psychologically more vulnerable to sexual exploitation by men.”). There is a similar body of 
research and literature regarding those who are filmed for pornography. See, e.g., MacKinnon, 
Pornography, supra note 1, at 995 (characterizing pornography as an industry “built on force, 
some physical, some not,” in which “women and children” are “not there by choice but because 
of lack of choices” and “‘consent’ . . . only in the degraded and demented sense of the word . . . in 
which a person who despairs at stopping what is happening, sees no escape, has no real 
alternative, was often sexually abused before as a child, may be addicted to drugs, is homeless, 
hopeless, is often trying to avoid being beaten or killed, is almost always economically desperate, 
acquiesces in being sexually abused for payment . . . .”); id. at 998 (“The majority of adults enter 
the industry as children and are exploited in ways that do not disappear when they reach the age 
of majority.”). However, there is some dispute about these accounts of the conditions and 
experiences associated with prostitution. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond 
Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 523, 534–35 (2000) (noting competing accounts).  
 4. Others have noted the seeming overlap between prostitution and pornography. See, e.g., 
MacKinnon, Pornography, supra note 1, at 996–97 (“To distinguish pornography from 
prostitution . . . is to deny the obvious: when you make pornography of a woman, you make a 
prostitute of her.”); id. at 993 (noting that in pornography “the bulk of the industry’s products . . . 
are rented out for use in commercial sex acts,” and arguing that anti-trafficking laws are “more 
promising for addressing pornography than has been recognized”); id. at 997 (quoting a United 
Nations Secretary-General report observing that “it is hard to make distinctions . . . between 
prostitution and other sexual services, including those of the pornographic media”). 
  Some have relied on this apparent similarity to argue that paid pornographic acting 
should be treated as prostitution. See, e.g., Zachary David Streit, Note, Birds of an Illegal 
Feather: Prostitution and Paid Pornography Should Be Criminalized Together, 5 CARDOZO PUB. 
L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 729, 733 (2007); see also Sarah H. Garb, Sex for Money Is Sex for Money: 
The Illegality of Pornographic Film as Prostitution, 13 LAW & INEQ. 281, 301 (1995) (arguing 
that prostitution statutes should be extended to treat producers of pornography as promoters; 
“prostitution behind a camera is still prostitution”). 
  The issue has not uncommonly arisen in a somewhat more complicated way, with 
authorities prosecuting the director or producer for pandering (i.e. pimping) because the director 
arranged for the actors to engage in sex with each other for money. The director can only be 
guilty of pandering, of course, if the actors engaged in prostitution, requiring the courts to 
determine whether they did so. See, e.g., People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128, 1130 (Cal. 1988) 
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Nevertheless, many jurisdictions do treat (1) as prostitution while holding 
that (2) is not. This Article aims to explain why. It begins with a brief review 
of the conventional understanding of prostitution and a survey of cases 
considering whether pornographic acting5 fits within this conventional 
understanding, highlighting the seemingly anomalous treatment of 
pornographic acting. Having set out this anomalous divergence, this Article 
assesses a number of the more accessible possible justifications for this 
divergence. It considers several rationales offered by the courts, and several 
possible moralistic and harm-oriented justifications (informed by traditional 
liberal, feminist, and sex-progressive views). Though many of these 
justifications have some superficial appeal, it concludes that these justifications 
are unsatisfying—either because they fail to adequately explain the divergence 
or because they are grounded in implausible premises. 
Dissatisfied with such justifications, this Article looks instead for an 
explanation—an account that will help us understand why the law makes this 
anomalous distinction between prostitution and pornographic acting, even if it 
cannot be justified. After considering an intriguing but inadequate political 
process explanation, this Article develops an explanation rooted in a complex 
of cultural attitudes about sex, and especially in cultural anxieties about the 
imagined ways in which sex may taint or corrupt men. This is an explanation 
that comes from our culture’s folk theories about sex, theories that themselves 
look more like childish superstitions than defensible foundations for policy or 
law. As such, this explanation does not justify the law’s divergent treatment of 
prostitution and pornographic acting, but it may help us better understand the 
origins and persistence of this anomaly in the law. 
On this folk theory explanation, the divergence at issue springs from the 
interplay between a cultural commitment to sating male desire and a cultural 
 
(holding that the director was not guilty of pandering because acting in pornographic film was not 
prostitution). 
  While this Article focuses on the law’s differential treatment of apparently similar acts of 
prostitution and pornography, similar questions might be asked about how the law treats other 
scenarios that are arguably like prostitution in important ways. Stripping and other (ostensibly) 
non-contact, live sexual performances raise these questions in obvious ways, but it has also 
become cliché, for example, to ask whether marriage, “gold digging,” or having sex with a date 
who paid for dinner are like prostitution. See, e.g., David A. J. Richards, Commercial Sex and the 
Rights of the Person: A Moral Argument for the Decriminalization of Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1195, 1206 (1979). More subtly, Lauren Kaplin has highlighted “the parallels between 
sexual harassment and prostitution and their almost antithetical treatments by the law.” Lauren 
Kaplin, When Money Changes Hands: “Unwelcomeness” in Sex for Money, 33 WOMEN’S RTS. 
L. REP. 43, 57 (2011) (Kaplin’s view is that prostitution law ought to be modified to better 
parallel sexual harassment law). 
 5. For the purposes of this article, the term “pornographic acting” is meant to refer to 
sexual conduct engaged in with another person while being photographed, video recorded, or 
otherwise recorded for subsequent viewing or consumption by other parties. 
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anxiety about dangers imagined to lie in direct sexual involvement with the 
female. According to ideas common in our cultural folklore, satiation of male 
sexual desire is a compelling good, and prostitution and pornography both 
serve to sate male desire. Prostitution, however, threatens to taint or corrupt the 
male consumer in a way that pornography does not. It does so because it 
requires direct physical involvement of the male consumer with the female 
provider, contact that exposes the male consumer to an array of physical, 
moral, and social contaminations that folk theories of sexuality attribute—in 
the tenor of a superstition or a child’s anxiety about “cooties”—to such 
physical intimacy. Pornography, in contrast, does not require this direct 
physical involvement,6 and thus it spares the male consumer from these 
dangerous physical, moral, and social contaminations. On these folk theories, 
then, pornography strikes a more “favorable” balance between sating male 
desire and protecting men from potential corruption than prostitution does. 
This explains why performing sex for money in pornography is privileged over 
doing so in prostitution.7 The former does not involve direct sexual contact 
with the male consumer, and thus it does not threaten to taint or corrupt the 
male consumer in the way that direct sexual contact does. 
Of course, this cultural mythology about sex does not supply a defensible 
justification for the state of the law any more than childish folklore about 
cooties does. Indeed, on the contrary, it resonates strongly with atavistic and 
ugly ideologies about gender and sex. It does, however, help explain why the 
criminalization of prostitution persists so stubbornly today, despite the 
increasingly pervasive acceptance of feminist, libertarian, and sex-positive 
insights that might lead to decriminalization, and why the law treats 
prostitution differently than it treats pornographic acting. The explanation 
offered here, then, does not harmonize the law, but it does diagnose in it a 
persisting pathology. 
 
 6. Of course, the sort of pornography at issue here does often involve direct physical, 
sexual involvement between a male and a female. As I argue below, however, the law’s primary 
concern appears to be about the male consumer (the prostitute’s client or the one who watches the 
pornography), such that the male participant in the pornography is rendered (paradoxically) 
invisible. He may be treated as already corrupted or merely incidental, or he may be “sacrificed” 
for the benefit of the masses of male consumers. 
 7. The privilege referred to lies in the formal legal status of the two activities: under the 
laws at issue, prostitution is a crime, while sex-for-pornography is not. It is true that the formal 
legal categories are only a small part of the functional picture, in which prostitution is so widely 
practiced that its formal illegality may seem a sham. Nevertheless, this Article assumes that the 
formal legal distinction matters. It matters, in part, because it is not accurate to say that the 
criminal prohibition against prostitution is a sham, given that there continue to be a very high 
volume of prostitution-related arrests today. It matters, also, because of the expressive value of 
the formal law. By labeling some conduct criminal prostitution and other conduct non-criminal 
acting-in-pornography, the law sustains and cultivates certain values and beliefs. One purpose of 
this Article is to develop a clearer picture of those beliefs and values. 
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Though this Article is primarily concerned with a discrete anomaly in the 
law of vice, uncovering the pathology that perpetuates the anomaly may have 
some implications for larger questions in vice theory. For example, while this 
Article does not directly address the long-standing and fiercely debated 
questions as to whether prostitution and pornography should be criminalized in 
the first place, the analysis here may have some bearing on those debates, 
resonating at some points with pro-abolition feminism and at others with anti-
criminalization feminism, libertarianism, and sex-progressivism. Likewise, 
while this Article does not directly address pressing questions about the future 
of vice law after Lawrence and in an increasingly libertarian and sex-
progressive political culture, the analysis here may have some implications for 
the future of vice law generally, highlighting the way some pockets of vice law 
may be sheltered from cultural shifts by cultural preoccupations as stubborn 
and resistant to analysis as playground superstition. In these ways, unpacking 
this anomaly may cast new light on broader issues in the law of vice. 
II.  THE MEANING OF “PROSTITUTION” AND THE ANOMALY OF PORNOGRAPHIC 
ACTING 
The anomaly at the heart of this Article is that the law treats pornographic 
acting as though it is not prostitution, despite employing a definition of 
prostitution that seems to straightforwardly encompass pornographic acting. 
A. The Meaning of “Prostitution” 
In popular use, the term “prostitution” has not had a crisp and stable 
meaning. Rather, its meaning has changed in important ways over time,8 and it 
has been used to cover a range of significantly different experiences and 
activities.9 
A standard definition, appearing in both popular discourse and law, is that 
prostitution is “the exchange of sexual activity for money.”10 This basic 
definition, however, may not capture everything that the term prostitution 
connotes, and richer definitions are therefore not uncommon. One such 
alternative incorporates the idea that prostitution must be “indiscriminate”: a 
prostitute is “an individual who indiscriminately provides sexual relations in 
 
 8. See, e.g., Law, supra note 3, at 525 (noting change in meaning of “prostitution” over 
time); Zatz, supra note 1, at 278–79 (discussing variation in meaning and practice of prostitution 
across time and place). 
 9. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 1, at 94 (drawing on field research to “problematize the 
category of ‘prostitute’” and “to suspend belief in any essential meaning of prostitution”); id. at 
99 (“[D]ifferent varieties of prostitution may have different social meanings . . . .”). 
 10. Tom DeFranco & Rebecca Stellato, Prostitution and Sex Work, 14 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 
553, 555–56 (2013); see also Zatz, supra note 1, at 279 (“[P]rovisionally” defining prostitution as 
“attending to the sexual desires of a particular individual (or individuals) with bodily acts in 
exchange for payment of money”). 
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return for money payments.”11 Prostitution has also been defined in gendered 
terms, as something that only women can do,12 and it has sometimes been 
defined, without the requirement of commercial exchange, as promiscuous or 
indiscriminate female sexual conduct.13 The term “prostitution” is also 
sometimes defined without reference to sexual conduct, applying to those who 
use or give something of value for an unworthy purpose.14 
American courts have long been pressed to clarify what prostitution means, 
and they have struggled to respond. In one well-known 1846 Massachusetts 
case, for example, the state argued that a man who sought to lure a woman into 
leaving her father’s home to have sex with him should be guilty of “taking 
away an unmarried woman for the purpose of prostitution.”15 The court treated 
the question as a difficult one, acknowledging that in popular use the term 
“prostitution” was used in diverse ways, some of which might cover engaging 
in unmarried intercourse. Ultimately, the court resorted to the narrower 
“definitions of lexicographers,” which held that prostitution should involve 
payment and indiscriminate sex with multiple partners.16 
The term is also often associated with the concept of “profession.” An old 
and common cliché labels prostitution “the oldest profession,”17 and those 
parsing the concept sometimes find the element of professionalism in the 
requirement that there be a “fee,” as fee is sometimes understood to be a 
payment in return for a professional service.18 This is why, it is said, a 
 
 11. Richards, supra note 4, at 1203. 
 12. Zatz, supra note 1, at 279; Richards, supra note 4, at 1204. 
 13. Zatz, supra note 1, at 279 n.5; Law, supra note 3, at 525; Richards, supra note 4, at 
1204. 
 14. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction 
ary/prostitute [http://perma.cc/T4LW-5UER] (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) (defining “prostitute” as 
“to offer indiscriminately for sexual intercourse especially for money” and “to devote to corrupt 
or unworthy purposes”). 
 15. Commonwealth v. Cook, 53 Mass. 93, 93 (Mass. 1846).  
 16. Id. at 97–98. The court wrote: 
If we refer to Walker’s Dictionary, we find prostitution defined “the act of setting to sale;” 
“the life of a public strumpet.” A prostitute is defined “a hireling; a mercenary; one who 
set to sale; a public strumpet.” Johnson defines a prostitute “a public strumpet; a hireling.” 
To prostitute, “to expose upon vile terms.” In Webster’s Dictionary, prostitution is “the 
act or practice of offering the body to an indiscriminate intercourse with men.” Prostitute 
is “a female given to indiscriminate lewdness; a strumpet.” Prostituting is “offering to 
indiscriminate lewdness.” These definitions, it will be seen, all apply to prostitution the 
act of permitting illicit intercourse for hire, an indiscriminate intercourse, or what is 
deemed public prostitution. 
Id. at 97. 
 17. See, e.g., Zatz, supra note 1, at 278 (“It is quite common to talk glibly of prostitution as 
the world’s oldest profession, existing universally across time and place.”). 
 18. People v. Block, 337 N.Y.S.2d 153, 157 (Nassau Cty. Ct. 1972). 
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romantic partner who provides sex in return for a gift is not engaging in 
prostitution.19 
Statutory definitions today typically specify that prostitution requires 
sexual conduct (or an offer or agreement to engage in sexual conduct) in 
exchange for a fee.20 The contours of the relevant sexual activity are not 
always clear but typically include intercourse, oral sex, anal sex, and 
masturbation.21 Sexual conduct may also include other physical contact with 
specified (typically “intimate”) body parts intended to gratify sexual desire.22 
Conduct that gratifies sexual desire but does not include physical contact—
such as erotic dancing or other sexual performances for a viewing audience—is 
generally not considered prostitution23 (though it does fall within the broader 
category of sex work). The “fee” requirement is normally interpreted broadly, 
so that it may be satisfied not only by monetary payments but also by other 
valuable compensation (such as a gold necklace or an expensive drink).24 
Prostitution laws are also understood to be inapplicable to married couples, 
even when one partner compensates the other for sexual activity.25 
These popular and legal definitions, then, encompass a cluster of 
components. They generally require that the prostitute engage in sexual 
conduct, and that the conduct is exchanged for a fee or thing of value.26 It is 
generally understood that the participants must not be married. It is sometimes 
suggested that the sexual conduct must be provided indiscriminately (perhaps 
as shown by frequency and large numbers of partners), though statutory 
definitions generally do not incorporate this requirement. The idea that 
prostitution is “promiscuous unchastity in women,”27 once essential to the 
popular understanding, is generally not reflected in contemporary formal or 
legal definitions of prostitution (except perhaps though the exclusion of marital 
sexual conduct).28 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. DeFranco & Stellato, supra note 10, at 557. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See, e.g., Pryor v. Municipal Court, 599 P.2d 636, 639 (Cal. 1979) (defining the sexual 
conduct required for prostitution as including “the touching of the genitals, buttocks, or the 
female breast, for the purposes of sexual arousal, [or] gratification”).  
 23. DeFranco & Stellato, supra note 10, at 555, 559. 
 24. Id. at 560. 
 25. Id. at 565. 
 26. While the monetary exchange appears essential to contemporary understanding of 
prostitution, the term has sometimes been used to refer to women who had multiple sexual 
partners, highlighting the term’s malleability. Zatz, supra note 1, at 279.  
 27. Richards, supra note 4, at 1204. 
 28. Id. 
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B. The Anomaly of Pornographic Acting 
Given this understanding of prostitution, it appears that when a person is 
paid to engage in sex for the purpose of a pornographic film that person 
commits prostitution. That person engages in sexual conduct and does so in 
exchange for a fee or thing of value. Normally, pornographic actors are not 
married to each other, and most pornographic actors engage in sex 
professionally, indiscriminately, and promiscuously. On both basic and 
complex conventional understandings of prostitution, pornographic acting is 
prostitution. 
And yet, despite this definitional fit, there is something wrong with calling 
pornographic acting prostitution. At least in the context of contemporary 
American popular culture, it feels “off,” forced, or counterintuitive to call a 
pornographic actor a prostitute. There is today an extraordinarily rich and 
profuse public discourse about pornography, and this discourse often focuses 
on individual pornographic actors, but those actors are generally not referred to 
as prostitutes, and their conduct is generally not referred to as prostitution. 
That is, unguarded and natural popular discourse about pornography generally 
does not categorize pornographic acting as prostitution. In contemporary 
American popular culture, prostitution and pornographic acting are treated as 
though they are different things.29 
This seeming disjunction between definitions and unguarded popular 
discourse is reflected in the case law. A number of courts have considered 
whether a person who engages in pornographic acting commits the crime of 
prostitution, and the results so far suggest a struggle. Some courts have 
followed the straightforward definitional analysis and concluded that 
pornographic acting is prostitution, but the leading case and a number of other 
cases have followed the popular understanding and concluded that 
pornographic acting is not prostitution. 
Some cases do follow the straightforward definitional analysis and 
conclude that sex on film for money is prostitution.30 A New York court took 
 
 29. Anecdotally, students in my Vice Crime course do not normally raise the question 
whether sex for film might be prostitution until we study prostitution. Once we have a working 
definition for “prostitution,” one or more students ask why acting in pornography is not 
prostitution. The question is sometimes raised with a sense of anxiety that the student has 
misunderstood something because it does not seem right that the definition of “prostitution” 
encompasses sex for film; other students raise this question with pleasure at the prospect of 
upending expectations. Both the anxiety and the pleasure suggest that characterizing sex for film 
as prostitution is unexpected. 
 30. People v. Kovner, 409 N.Y.S.2d 349, 352 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); People v. Fixler, 128 
Cal. Rptr. 363, 365–66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); see also United States v. Roeder, 526 F.2d 736, 739 
(10th Cir. 1975) (holding that transporting a woman across state lines for the purpose of 
pornographic acting constituted a violation of the Mann Act, treating paid acting in pornography 
as equivalent to prostitution); State v. Kravitz, 511 P.2d 844, 846 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (holding 
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this view in People v. Kovner, where the defendant paid actors to engage in 
intercourse and other sexual conduct with each other while the defendant 
filmed them.31 Under New York law, prostitution included “engag[ing] . . . in 
sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee.” The Kovner court 
reasoned that the purpose and language of this statute encompassed the 
conduct of the actors in this case, for the statute “intended to prohibit . . . 
sexual conduct of a commercial nature,” and “[n]either the statute itself . . . nor 
any decisions interpreting it, exclude explicit sexual conduct by a paid 
performer from the definition of prostitution.”32 Another court reached a 
similar conclusion in Fixler, a California case in which the defendant 
photographed for publication models engaged in sexual activity with each 
other.33 The court emphasized that the plain language of the definition of 
prostitution encompassed the models’ conduct. Applying statutory language 
defining prostitution as “any lewd act between persons for money,” the court 
reasoned that “[t]here can be no question but that [one of the models] engaged 
in lewd acts and sexual intercourse for money;” indeed, the court thought it 
“self-evident that if A pays B to engage in sexual intercourse with C, then B is 
engaging in prostitution,” and that the result does not change just because “A 
may stand by to observe the act or photograph it.”34 
Other courts, however, have taken a different view, holding that sex on 
film for money does not constitute prostitution;35 sometimes treating this 
conclusion as one deeply entrenched in the law.36 The courts taking this view 
have offered an array of explanations. In the leading case Freeman, the 
California high court relied heavily on the First Amendment. As the court saw 
it, non-obscene pornographic films are protected expressions under the First 
 
that engaging in sex before a live audience for money constituted prostitution under the plain 
language of the prostitution statute); State v. Taylor, 808 P.2d 314, 318–19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) 
(same, where performance was “semi-private” because audience was limited to one person). 
 31. Kovner, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 350. 
 32. Id. at 351. 
 33. Fixler, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 364–65. 
 34. Id. at 365. Another California court followed similar plain language reasoning to hold 
that stage performers who engaged in sexual conduct with paying audience members were guilty 
of prostitution: “Nothing in the language of [the] Penal Code . . . defining ‘prostitution’ excludes 
such conduct merely because it occurs during a theatrical performance.” People v. Maita, 203 
Cal. Rptr. 685, 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
 35. The seminal case is Freeman. People v. Freeman, 758 P.2d 1128, 1130 (Cal. 1988); see 
also State v. Theriault, 960 A.2d 687, 692 (N.H. 2008); Escort Services, Adult Film Industry Not 
Similar; No First Amendment Issues With Brothels, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 4, 2005, at 19 (reprinting a 
2005 New York county trial court decision: People v. Paulino) [hereinafter Paulino]. 
 36. See, e.g., Paulino, supra note 35, at 19, where the court concluded that pornographic 
acting is not prostitution and bolstered this conclusion with the observation that “the 
pornographic motion picture industry has flourished without prosecution since its infancy.” 
(Presumably, the court meant that the industry had flourished without prosecution for prostitution, 
since pornography has long been prosecuted under obscenity statutes.)  
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Amendment. Treating the filmed performances as acts of prostitution “would 
rather obviously place a substantial burden on the exercise of protected First 
Amendment rights” and “therefore unconstitutionally infringe on First 
Amendment liberties.”37 In order to avoid this result, the court held that 
California’s definition of prostitution should not be read to encompass sex on 
film for money.38 Other courts have endorsed this reasoning.39 
Courts taking this view have also offered arguments rooted in a conceptual 
analysis of prostitution, looking past the statutory definition to find additional 
elements essential to the concept of prostitution. One such argument maintains 
that in prostitution the payor must pay for sexual conduct, and that in 
pornographic acting the payor pays for a performance or for acting rather than 
for sex.40 The Freeman court, for example, suggested this view. There, the 
court held that prostitution requires “the money . . . be paid for the purpose of 
sexual arousal or gratification;” this requirement, it said, was not met where 
the producer paid actors to engage in pornographic acting, where the payments, 
it said, were “acting fees” given “to the actors for performing in a non-obscene 
film.”41 Along similar lines, courts have reasoned that the performer’s conduct 
was not “for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification” (as required under 
some definitions of prostitution).42 
Another conceptual argument found in these cases contends that 
prostitution requires that the person who pays for the prostitute’s sexual 
conduct also participate in the sexual encounter.43 As one such court explains, 
“prostitution is and has always been intuitively defined as a bilateral exchange 
between a prostitute and a client,” “a bilateral exchange involving only two 
 
 37. Freeman, 758 P.2d at 1132. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See, e.g., Theriault, 960 A.2d at 692; Paulino, supra note 35, at 19. 
 40. See, e.g., Freeman, 758 P.2d at 1131; Theriault, 960 A.2d at 692. 
 41. Freeman, 758 P.2d at 1131. The court in Theriault made somewhat awkward use of this 
argument as well. There, the relevant statutes made a person guilty of prostitution if she engaged 
in certain acts conventionally seen as intrinsically sexual (including “penetration”), or if she 
engaged in other acts for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. The defendant was 
charged with soliciting prostitution for offering to pay a couple to engage in penetration for fifty 
dollars (one of the acts treated as intrinsically sexual under the statute). In holding that the 
defendant could not be found guilty of soliciting prostitution, the court suggested that conviction 
in his case would pose a greater threat to protected speech than conviction in cases alleging 
payment for acts intended to arouse or gratify. Theriault, 960 A.2d at 692. Under this reasoning, 
it appears that in order to convict, the state must avoid alleging the paradigmatic examples of 
prostitution (involving acts conventionally treated as intrinsically sexual, like intercourse) in 
favor of alleging less paradigmatic forms (e.g. rather than identifying the actual conduct 
(intercourse), characterizing the conduct as an act intended to arouse or gratify). It is at least 
awkward, if not implausible, to interpret speech rights so that they require (and can so easily be 
evaded by) such transparently disingenuous semantic maneuvers in charging. 
 42. People v. Maita, 203 Cal. Rptr. 685, 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
 43. Paulino, supra note 35, at 19. 
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parties,”44 one “where the sexual conduct is performed on the person who pays 
the fee.”45 This requirement is often unsatisfied in pornographic acting cases, 
where the payor is often a producer or director who does not participate in the 
filmed sexual conduct. 
The case law, then, tracks the disjunction between definitional analysis and 
popular discourse, with the more influential cases following the popular 
wisdom and treating pornographic acting as distinct from prostitution. Are they 
right to do so? After all, the prostitute and the pornographic actor engage in 
exactly the same physical conduct, with the same intent, for the same reason—
they have sex with another person for money. There is no reason to think that 
either is motivated by any sort of desire, arousal, love, or affection, and there is 
good reason to think that both are acting or performing. And, realistically, it 
seems very likely that both do so unhappily, under conditions of deprivation 
and limited choice, with a background of serious personal suffering. In short, 
whether we describe their acts simplistically or think about their cases 
holistically, the prostitute and the pornographic actor seem to be doing the 
same thing. Is this an anomaly, or is there a good reason to treat them 
differently under the law? 
III.  ARE THERE PLAUSIBLE RATIONALES FOR DIVERGENT TREATMENT? 
This Part considers several different possible rationales for the law’s 
divergent treatment of prostitution and pornographic acting. It begins by 
assessing the most prominent rationales in the case law described above46and 
flagging several problems in these rationales. Dissatisfied with the courts’ 
rationales, it next turns to some of the traditional criteria for criminalization 
and asks whether they supply better rationales. It starts with a moralistic 
analysis of the sort associated with legal moralists like Stephen and Devlin, 
and then it turns to the harm-oriented lens associated with Mill and Hart. Of 
course, these approaches can be flexible and indeterminate, making definitive 
analysis unlikely. Nevertheless, neither approach easily generates a fully 
plausible and satisfying rationale for the anomaly at issue. 
A. The Courts’ Rationales for Divergent Treatment 
As we have seen, courts have offered several different rationales for 
divergent treatment of prostitution and pornographic acting. Though each 
rationale has some appeal, none seem to supply a fully convincing rationale or 
explanation. 
 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. 
 46. See supra Part II(B). 
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1. First Amendment Rationale 
Perhaps the most developed rationale offered in the courts is the First 
Amendment rationale—that treating sex on film for money as prostitution 
would threaten speech protected by the First Amendment.47 This rationale, 
however, seems problematic. 
For one thing, as courts reaching contrary conclusions have pointed out, 
this rationale seems to conflate implausibly the expression in film with the 
conduct filmed. As they explain, we can distinguish the distribution of the 
pornography from the actor’s conduct, treating the former as protected speech 
and the latter as unprotected criminal conduct.48 We would surely do so, for 
example, with respect to a film showing the commission of a murder.49 While 
distribution of the film might be protected expression under the First 
Amendment, no one would contend that the First Amendment requires us to 
protect the underlying conduct—the murder—in order to avoid chilling such 
speech. As the Fixler court put it, “[w]hile First Amendment considerations 
may protect the dissemination . . . regardless of the manner in which the 
material was originally obtained, where a crime is committed in obtaining the 
material, the protection afforded its dissemination would not be a shield 
against prosecution for the crime committed in obtaining it.”50 Thus, while a 
film of sexual conduct may be protected expression under the First 
Amendment, it does not follow that the underlying conduct must therefore also 
be protected, even if that conduct is itself criminal. 
Another problem with this First Amendment rationale is that it does not 
line up well with other First Amendment analysis in this area. While it is true 
that pornography is protected expression under the First Amendment, it is not 
true that First Amendment doctrine is therefore loathe to chill pornographic 
speech. On the contrary, this is an area where the existing doctrine seems 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. People v. Fixler, 128 Cal. Rptr. 363, 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); People v. Kovner, 409 
N.Y.S.2d 349, 352 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).  
 49. Fixler, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 365–66.  
 50. Id. at 365. This analysis only has force if we have already determined that actors in 
pornography are in fact committing prostitution. Of course it is true, as the court reasoned, that 
filming a murder would not extend First Amendment protection to the murder, as the murder 
itself remains a crime. Presumably, the same would be true of filming intercourse where one 
participant had paid the other for sex, as the conduct being filmed would uncontroversially be 
prostitution. But the pornography cases are different, for they are not cases in which one 
participant is paying the other for sex. Rather, they are cases where a third party is paying both 
participants to have sex with each other. We can only treat this as analogous to the filmed murder 
scenario if we first hold that third-party-payor cases constitute prostitution, and if we hold that 
payment for pornographic acting is or includes payment for sexual conduct. While some courts 
have disputed these premises, their arguments have not been convincing, as discussed in the text 
to follow. 
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especially well constructed to chill expression.51 The dissemination of 
pornography can be and is criminalized when the pornography is obscene; 
thus, First Amendment doctrine straightforwardly tolerates criminalization of 
pornography, even though criminalizing some pornography might scare off 
those who wish to make and distribute pornography generally. Moreover, the 
standards used to distinguish protected pornography from obscene 
pornography are notoriously ambiguous and difficult to apply.52 It is therefore 
often difficult for a pornography distributor to determine whether the 
pornography distributed is protected or not. Realistically, then, distributors of 
pornographic materials operate under conditions of uncertainty with a 
significant potential to chill protected speech. In this light, it seems at least 
curious to hold that because films of sexual conduct may be protected 
expression, punishing acts of prostitution committed in service to those films 
would have an intolerable, chilling effect under the First Amendment.53 
A third problem with the First Amendment rationale is that it does not 
seem to play much role in the popular distinction between prostitution and 
pornography. While courts and scholars naturally spot that pornography has an 
expressive dimension that prostitution (at least at first glance) does not, 
popular discourse about pornographic actors does not seem to revolve 
around—or notice—this distinction. Pornographic works are not normally 
discussed as art or expression, and pornographic actors are not treated as the 
vehicles for ideas. This may help explain the Supreme Court’s persistent 
waffling about how best to characterize the value of pornographic media. Thus, 
even when courts hang their divergent treatments of prostitution and 
pornographic acting on a First Amendment hat, we might suspect that this 
rationale is a placeholder for other sorts of reasons. 
 
 51. Pornography, of course, flourishes today, but this appears to reflect tolerant enforcement 
practices rather than favorable law. Prevention and Control of Sexually Transmitted Infections 
and HIV in the Adult Film Industry, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.apha. 
org/policies-and-advocacy/public-health-policy-statements/policy-database/2014/07/28/15/23/pre 
vention-and-control-of-sexually-transmitted-infections-and-hiv-in-the-adult-film-industry 
[http://perma.cc/SGE6-Y2XK]. 
 52. David Cole, Playing by Pornography’s Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 
U. PA. L. REV. 111, 111 (1994) (“The Court has now put forward a set of doctrinal ‘rules’ that in 
the end do little more than obscure what is basically Stewart’s intuitive approach . . . advanc[ing] 
an incoherent formula.”). 
 53. Note that even if paid pornographic acting constitutes prostitution, pornographic acting 
need not be paid. Indeed, it appears that there is now a flourishing practice of disseminating video 
of unpaid sex on the Internet (such as video created by the performers themselves). Marcus 
Baram, Free Porn Threatens Adult Film Industry, ABC NEWS (June 11, 2007), http://abcnews. 
go.com/Business/story?id=3259416&page=1 [http://perma.cc/YED7-P6JA]. 
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2. The Non-Participating Payor Argument 
As we have seen, the courts have not been content to rely solely on First 
Amendment rationales and have supplemented them with rationales rooted in 
conceptual arguments, including the non-participating payor argument and the 
payment-for-performance argument. 
The first conceptual argument—that there is no prostitution if the payor 
does not participate in the sex54—runs into some significant problems, too. 
First, as the minority view courts have noted, the statutes at issue have 
generally not, on their own terms, made an exception for cases where the fee 
was paid by a third party.55 On the contrary, the statutes generally use language 
that appears to straightforwardly encompass cases involving a non-
participating payor.56 On plain language grounds, then, there should not be any 
exemption for non-participant payor cases. 
Second, this conceptual analysis of prostitution seems plainly at odds with 
the conventional understanding of prostitution. Indeed, it conflicts with various 
cases traditionally and un-controversially treated as prostitution, and perhaps 
even as paradigmatic instances of prostitution. For example, in one classic and 
oft-repeated prostitution narrative, a father pays a prostitute to have sex with 
his adolescent son in order to introduce him to sex or “steer” him away from 
homosexuality.57 In another long-standing narrative—recently employed in 
popular media, such as the popular television drama Mad Men—a company or 
businessperson wooing a potential client arranges for the client to have sex 
with a prostitute.58 In both examples, the payor does not participate in the sex, 
yet there is no uncertainty that the prostitute engages in prostitution. Similar 
narratives circulate about prostitutes provided at bachelor parties and parties in 
 
 54. See supra Part II(B). 
 55. People v. Kovner, 409 N.Y.S.2d 349, 351 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (“That the fee paid for 
the sexual activity was provided by a non-participant or that the defendant’s object was to 
photograph the activity creates no legal distinction.”). 
 56. See supra Part II(A). 
 57. Numerous recent news reports highlight that such conduct is routinely viewed by media, 
prosecutors, and juries as prostitution. Father Who Asked Prostitute to Take 14-Year-Old Son’s 
Virginity as a Present Is Spared Jail, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (May 15, 2009), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1182548/Father-asked-prostitute-14-year-old-sons-vir 
ginity-present-spared-jail.html [http://perma.cc/LJG7-4MLQ] (father prosecuted for seeking to 
arrange for prostitute to have sex with son); Greg Stolz, Dad Charged for Son’s Alleged Holiday 
Sex With Prostitute, COURIER-MAIL (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queens 
land/dad-charged-for-sons-alleged-holiday-sex-with-prostitute/story-e6freoof-1226611985342 
[http://perma.cc/Y4W5-R3X2]. 
 58. The trope appears at least twice in the fifth season of Mad Men. Prostitution Theme in 
Mad Men, WIKIA, http://madmen.wikia.com/wiki/Prostitution_theme_in_Mad_Men [http://per 
ma.cc/5SLC-KPPV] (last visited Sept. 21, 2015). 
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male-dominated workplaces,59 and prostitutes paid for as “gifts” on other 
occasions.60 Given non-participating payor prostitution clichés like these, the 
suggestion that “prostitution is and has always been intuitively defined as a 
bilateral exchange between a prostitute and client . . . where the sexual conduct 
is performed on the person who pays the fee,”61 seems plainly inconsistent 
with the popular conventional understanding of prostitution. This conceptual 
rationale for the legal divergence, then, depends on a basic misunderstanding 
of the concept of prostitution. 
3. The Payment-for-Performance Argument 
The second conceptual argument found in the cases is that there is no 
prostitution in pornographic acting because the actors are paid for acting or for 
a performance rather than for sex.62 This rationale, however, seems 
disingenuous, for it is plain that the actors are paid not only to act or provide a 
performance but also to engage in sexual conduct. An actor contracted to 
perform in a pornographic film would likely be let go and found to have 
breached the contract if that actor refused to engage in actual sexual conduct, 
even if that actor offered to engage in simulated sexual conduct instead. 
Likewise, a consumer who purchased a film marketed as pornographic might 
protest deception upon discovering that the film depicted simulated rather than 
actual sexual conduct. Indeed, obscenity law has generally distinguished 
between simulated and actual sex on film. From the perspectives of producers, 
consumers, and courts, then, at least some of the value in pornographic acting 
lies in the actor’s engagement in actual sexual conduct. If so, it is implausible 
to say that the pornographic actor is paid only for acting or for a performance. 
On the contrary, at least a substantial part of the value for which the actor is 
paid is the actual sexual conduct. 
The inadequacy of this conceptual argument for divergent treatment can 
also be seen from the other side of the coin, for prostitution can also plausibly 
be characterized as acting or performance. As ample research documents, at 
 
 59. For example, The Wolf of Wall Street, a recent movie drama depicting male-dominated 
Wall Street workplaces in the late 1900s, included several scenes of workplace parties in which 
organizers paid prostitutes to engage with other employees. Alyssa Rosenberg, Why ‘The Wolf of 
Wall Street’ Is the Most Controversial Nominee for Best Picture, THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 25, 
2014), http://thinkprogress.org/alyssa/2014/02/25/3299381/wolf-wall-street/ [http://perma.cc/D9 
BF-8PLH]. 
 60. Along these lines, a spate of recent news and gossip stories describe an actress hiring a 
prostitute to have sex with her actor husband as a birthday gift. Erin Cunningham, Actress Jenny 
Mollen Talks Hiring Prostitutes for Husband Jason Biggs and Embracing Her Crazy, DAILY 
BEAST (June 30, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/30/actress-jenny-mollen-
talks-hiring-prostitutes-for-husband-jason-biggs-and-embracing-her-crazy.html [http://perma.cc/ 
WLE4-MFEY]. 
 61. Paulino, supra note 35, at 19. 
 62. See supra Part II(B).  
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least the vast majority of prostitutes do not engage in sex with clients out of 
sexual desire and do not experience any sexual pleasure with clients. At the 
same time, many clients believe that prostitutes engage in sexual conduct with 
them from desire and with pleasure.63 In this sense, prostitutes supply a 
performance of sexual engagement. Indeed, prostitutes themselves sometimes 
report that they see their work not as providing sex but as providing a 
performance,64 with the client as the audience. Thus, even if pornographic 
actors are paid for a performance or for acting, this may not distinguish 
pornographic actors from prostitutes. 
A related argument seen in some cases is that prostitution entails payment 
to arouse or gratify another person, and that the pornographic actor is not paid 
to arouse or gratify another person.65 After all, it may be true that so long as 
the actors in a pornographic film appear to the audience to be aroused or 
gratified the audience will be satisfied, and thus that the actors need not cause 
actual arousal or gratification in their partners. 
But this argument, too, seems disingenuous. For one thing, it seems most 
likely that at least some pornographic actors are expected to cause or 
contribute to arousal or gratification in their partners. For another thing, this 
argument places an implausible meaning on the arousal/gratification element. 
It appears that, in statutes that include this requirement, the primary purposes 
of this requirement are two-fold: first, to make clear that those paid to engage 
in genital or otherwise intimate contact for non-sexual purposes, such as 
doctors, do not commit prostitution; and second, to provide a catch-all 
description of sexual conduct sufficing for prostitution so that detailed 
enumeration is not necessary. Indeed, a not uncommon structure for a statutory 
definition for the sexual conduct element of prostitution first establishes that 
certain behaviors, like intercourse and oral sex, constitute sexual conduct 
(without regard to sexual arousal or gratification), and then it provides that 
other physical contact intended to cause sexual arousal or gratification also 
counts as sexual conduct.66 
 
 63. MacKinnon, Trafficking, supra note 1, at 285, 295.  
 64. Zatz, supra note 1, at 284, 284 n.12. 
 65. See supra Part II(B).  
 66. In New York, for example, it is prostitution to engage in “sexual conduct” for a fee. By 
statute, “‘[s]exual conduct’ means sexual intercourse, oral sexual conduct, anal sexual conduct, 
aggravated sexual contact, or sexual contact.” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(10) (2004). “Sexual 
contact” is defined as “any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person . . . for the 
purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party. It includes the touching of the actor by the 
victim, as well as the touching of the victim by the actor, whether directly or through clothing.” 
N.Y. PENAL LAW §130.00(3). Thus, § 130.00(10) identifies certain conduct as sexual conduct 
without regard to the intent to arouse or gratify, including intercourse, oral sex, and anal sex (each 
of which are themselves defined by reference to the body parts involved, without reference to 
sexual gratification without arousal. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(1)–(2)). It also includes a 
catchall—“sexual contact”—for other intimate touching for the purpose of sexual gratification. 
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It seems implausible, then, that the purpose of such an element (where it 
appears) is to exempt from prostitution the sort of conduct occurring in 
pornography. For one thing, we normally characterize physical interactions 
such as intercourse, oral sex, and anal sex as “sex,” so long as they are 
voluntary, without considering whether they are intended to cause arousal or 
gratification, making it unlikely that we would intentionally exempt those 
interactions from the category of “sexual conduct.” For another thing, if what 
pornographic actors do does not aim for arousal or gratification in the relevant 
sense, it is not clear that what prostitutes do does either. (In both pornography 
and prostitution, that is, there may be an expectation that the other partner’s 
fantasy and imagination are the “real” source of any arousal or gratification 
that partner experiences.) If so, the suggestion that pornographic acting is not 
prostitution because it does not involve the intent to arouse or gratify the other 
actor seems to misunderstand the role of the arousal/gratification element in 
those statutes that include it. 
At bottom, the problem with this line of conceptual rationales for divergent 
treatment is that it depends on artificially narrow characterizations of paid 
pornographic acting and prostitution. When producers of pornography pay 
actors to engage in sex for film, the payment reflects the value of the actual 
sexual conduct, not just the acting or performance; and when prostitutes 
engage in sexual conduct, they may do so in a way that includes elements of 
acting or performance. The purported conceptual boundary between the two is 
not sufficiently robust to pry apart these two instances of sex for money. 
B. Moralistic Rationales for Divergent Treatment 
In addition to the rationales suggested in the cases above, rationales might 
be found in the traditional criteria for criminalization, including the legal 
moralist criteria associated with Stephen and Devlin, and the harm-oriented 
criteria associated with Mill and Hart. 
Some rationales for criminalizing prostitution point to moralistic 
rationales—ethical objections to prostitution that do not depend upon any 
allegation that prostitution causes harm.67 While there has long been 
controversy about whether such “purely” moral rationales can be legitimate 
 
Thus, the statutory scheme treats certain sorts of physical interactions as sexual conduct (and thus 
sufficient for prostitution) without regard for arousal or gratification. Other statutory schemes 
follow this bifurcated model (treating certain conduct as sufficient for prostitution without regard 
to arousal or gratification, while treating other conduct as sufficient only when there a purpose to 
arouse or gratify). State v. Theriault, 960 A.2d 687, 689 (N.H. 2008) (describing New 
Hampshire’s bifurcated statutory scheme). 
 67. DeFranco & Stellato, supra note 10, at 579. 
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grounds for criminal prohibitions,68 it seems plausible that moralistic rationales 
continue to shape the criminal law, especially with respect to vice regulation. 
Indeed, though policy analysis often focuses on the harms associated with 
prostitution and the costs of criminalization, such moralistic objections may be 
the most important actual drivers of criminalization of prostitution.69 
If so, we might find an explanation for the law’s divergent treatment of 
prostitution and pornographic acting in such moralistic reasoning, such as the 
traditional sexual mores that restricted sex to marriage and procreation, and 
strictly limited female sexual conduct, or contemporary sexual mores that 
require significant interpersonal connection between sexual partners or object 
to commodification of the human body or of sex. 
1. Traditional Norms for Sexual Conduct 
On traditional views, sex is immoral unless it meets strict requirements. On 
the strictest traditional views, it must occur within a marriage, and its purpose 
must be procreation.70 Traditional norms also place special limitations on 
female sexual behavior as compared to male sexual behavior, a double 
standard under which it is inappropriate for women to seek or initiate sexual 
encounters, engage in sex with multiple partners over time, engage in sex 
without accompanying “sentimental attachment” to her partner, and perhaps 
even to desire sex at all.71 
A woman who engages in prostitution violates at least several of these 
norms. She engages in sex outside of marriage and does so without aiming to 
procreate. Prostitution is (by definition) non-marital sex, in which the client 
(whether single or married) is not married to the prostitute, and prostitution is 
almost never engaged in for the purpose of procreation. Moreover, the 
 
 68. Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 115, 119, 139 n.112, 141 n.115 (2000); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
571, 574, 576–78 (2003). 
 69. Richards, supra note 4, at 1219 (“[I]t is disingenuous to suppose that the basis for the 
American criminal prohibition of prostitution rests on secular concerns for criminogenesis and 
veneral disease control. . . . These arguments are, at best, post hoc empirical makeweights for 
justifications of a quite different order, namely, moralistic and paternalistic arguments of a 
peculiarly American provenance.”). 
 70. See Chamallas, supra note 3, at 781, 784–85 (discussing “traditional view of sexual 
conduct”); Richards, supra note 4, at 1210–11, 1213, 1219–20 (tracing the development of 
Christian moral views regarding sex, marriage, and prostitution from pre-Reformation period to 
modern America, associating anti-prostitution laws with “a reigning theory of sentimental 
marriage” and the purity leagues that adopted this theory); id. at 1237 (discussing traditional 
procreation norm).  
 71. Law, supra note 3, at 542 (describing traditional norms, including double standards); 
Richards, supra note 4, at 1220 (describing traditional norms, including expectation of 
“sentimental attachments of a kind perfected in monogamous marriage,” and noting the 
“Victorian model of female asexuality”).  
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prostitute seeks and initiates sex with her partners, and likely does so with 
many partners over time, without any sentimental attachment to her partners.72 
Traditional narratives about prostitutes also saw in their prostitution evidence 
of inappropriate sexual desire, and thus a violation of the prescription against 
female sexual desire, but the dominant and well-supported view today is that 
prostitutes normally do not expect or find sexual pleasure in prostitution.73 
Thus, prostitution straightforwardly violates several traditional norms 
regarding sexuality generally and female sexuality in particular. 
These norms, however, cannot explain the law’s divergent treatment of 
prostitution and pornographic acting. For one thing, it is implausible that such 
norms explain or justify the current criminalization of prostitution at all, as 
these traditional norms are no longer widely held. Contemporary sexual ethics 
appear to have become significantly more liberal and plural than the traditional 
view.74 The procreation requirement is rarely invoked today.75 The suggestion 
that there is something wrong with non-marital sex may still circulate but 
appears primarily confined to fundamentalist religious populations. Traditional 
restrictions on female sexuality still do have a significant cultural presence but 
no longer appear dominant (at least in their strictest forms).76 In short, 
traditional norms constitute an implausible explanation for the criminalization 
of prostitution. 
Nor can such norms explain the law’s distinguishing between prostitution 
and pornographic acting, for pornographic acting will nearly always involve 
the same transgressions. Normally, the actors in pornographic film are not 
married, do not engage in sex in order to produce a child, and do seek out and 
initiate sexual encounters with multiple partners. Thus, even if traditional 
 
 72. Richards, supra note 4, at 1250, 1253–55 (discussing (and critiquing) the view that the 
prostitute’s “unchaste sex” justifies her condemnation).  
 73. MacKinnon, Trafficking, supra note 1, at 285, 295. 
 74. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 782, 790 (noting the shift from traditional to liberal views 
regarding sexuality in the mid- to late- 1900s); Richards, supra note 4, at 1220 (discussing the 
shift from conservative traditional norms to more flexible contemporary norms); David A.J. 
Richards, Pornography Commissions and the First Amendment: On Constitutional Values and 
Constitutional Facts, 39 ME. L. REV. 275, 293 (1987) (discussing the American shift from 
traditional Victorian norms regarding sexuality; “that sexual morality is now under legitimate 
conscientious debate in society at large on the ground that it is immorally repressive and unjust”). 
 75. Law, supra note 3, at 531 (attributing to David A.J. Richards the observation that “[t]he 
notion that sex must be confined to procreation has been widely rejected”); Richards, supra note 
4, at 1237–38 (setting out principled and empirical objections to procreation norm and its 
assumptions about human sexuality, suggesting these objections account for the shift away from 
procreation norm in law).  
 76. Law, supra note 3, at 543 (“[T]raditional conservative moral ideas about . . . gender roles 
are alive and strong in contemporary U.S. society.”); id. at 545 (“The conservative vision of 
appropriate sexual relations is premised on gender differentiated concepts of the interests and 
capacities of men and women, which are inconsistent with contemporary commitments to gender 
equality.”). 
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morality regarding sex offered a rationale for sanctioning prostitution, it does 
not offer any grounds for distinguishing between prostitution and pornographic 
acting. Both violate those norms in flagrant and profound ways. 
2. Contemporary Norms for Sexual Conduct 
The liberalization and pluralization of sexual norms makes it more difficult 
to identify easily stated and widely endorsed moral principles supporting 
condemnation of prostitution today. Nevertheless, there may still be some 
popular moral notions supporting criminalization of prostitution. For example, 
some may hold that people should only have sex if they are committed to each 
other, love each other, or have affection for each other.77 Or there may be 
support for the idea that people should only have sex with each other in order 
to achieve or reinforce emotional intimacy or a significant personal 
connection.78 
On these sorts of views—each of which make sex’s moral legitimacy 
depend upon a positive and potentially lasting interpersonal connection—
prostitution appears to be morally wrong.79 At least on conventional accounts, 
prostitutes and their clients make no commitment to each other, do not love 
each other, do not have affection for each other, and do not engage in sex in 
order to achieve or reinforce any sort of emotional intimacy or significant 
personal connection. Thus, on these conventional accounts, prostitution is 
morally wrong. 
Once again, however, these moral principles do not supply any rationale 
for distinguishing prostitution from pornographic acting. At least on 
conventional accounts, actors in pornography normally do not commit to, love, 
or feel affection for each other. Nor do they engage in sex in order to achieve 
or reinforce any sort of emotional intimacy or personal connection. Thus, while 
these more contemporary norms regarding sex offer some possible rationales 
 
 77. Richards, supra note 4, at 1220 (“For many, the objection to prostitution would today be 
based . . . on the transformation of sex into an impersonal encounter with no emotional 
significance”; the idea “rests on a vision of the necessary moral unity of sex and romantic love.”); 
id. at 1240, 1243–44 (discussing American cultural commitment to the “romantic love tradition,” 
manifest in part in the ideal of “companionate marriage,” and its implications for regulation of 
sexual conduct; noting that “[t]he Calvinist-Puritan view of companionate marriage [secularized 
during the Victorian period,] established romantic marital love not as one ideal among others, but 
as the exclusive form in which sexual and affectional feeling could legitimately be experienced”; 
noting that “Americans today . . . no longer limit the scope of romantic love to marital 
relationships”). 
 78. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (Detaching sex from intimacy after 
Lawrence).  
 79. Richards, supra note 4, at 1243 (“[P]rostitution is morally condemned . . . because it 
directly contravenes the model of romantic love . . . .”); id. at 1244 (“Romantic love occurs 
martially and extramaritally, homosexually and heterosexually. . . . [A]ll of these relationships, 
within limits, invoke it. But prostitution does not.”).  
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for sanctioning prostitution, they do not offer any grounds for distinguishing 
between prostitution and pornographic acting. 
Contemporary ethical theories have identified other moral objections to 
prostitution as well, some of which appear to play a role in contemporary 
popular moral thinking. Some of those objections point to the commodifying 
aspects of prostitution.80 On one view, it is morally wrong to commodify the 
human body (perhaps because treating the body like a thing is inconsistent 
with the integrity or the unique dignity of the human person, or because pricing 
the use of the body trivializes the worth of the human person, or because it 
contributes to degrading objectification of women’s bodies and thus to 
women’s subordination).81 On another closely related view, it is wrong to 
commodify sex (perhaps because sex is essential to personhood, so that 
commodifying sex raises the same objections as commodifying the human 
body; or because sex is otherwise special in a morally significant sense, and its 
specialness is diminished or damaged by pricing it). While these views are 
theoretically contested,82 they may resonate with some common moral 
intuitions about cases where sex and money become closely intertwined (seen 
not only in popular anxiety about prostitution but also in the oft-invoked trope 
of the “gold digger”). 
On these views, prostitution is morally wrong. By offering the use of the 
body for a fee, the prostitute sells the prostitute’s body; the practice therefore 
commodifies the human body;83 or the prostitute sells sex, thereby 
commodifying sex. Once again, however, these moral principles do not supply 
any rationale for distinguishing prostitution from pornographic acting. By 
offering the body for sex on film, the pornographic actor sells the actor’s body 
and thus commodifies the body, or sells sex and thus commodifies sex. Thus, 
while these moral objections to commodification of body and sex offer some 
possible rationales for sanctioning prostitution, they do not offer any grounds 
for distinguishing between prostitution and pornographic acting. 
 
 80. Id. at 1255–62 (discussing commodification).  
 81. Law, supra note 3, at 536–37 (summarizing Margaret Jane Radin’s argument against 
commodification of body and sexuality, which emphasizes that “selling of sexual[ity]” treats 
“essential attributes” of the person as “fungible objects,” thereby denying “the integrity and 
uniqueness of the self”); Richards, supra note 4, at 1220, 1256–58, 1261 (discussing links 
between commodification and objectification, “degradation of women,” and threats to “integrity 
of moral personality”). 
 82. Law, supra note 3, at 538 (noting objections to Radin’s arguments from 
commodification); Richards, supra note 4, at 1256–60 (challenging the commodification 
argument against prostitution, arguing that prostitution is sale of a service, not the body itself, and 
that sale of the body would not in any event threaten moral autonomy or personhood). 
 83. Frances M. Shaver, The Regulation of Prostitution: Avoiding the Morality Traps, 9 CAN. 
J.L. & SOC’Y 123, 135 (1994) (associating objections to selling the body with the “principled 
moralism” of “radical feminists”). Whether prostitution in fact commodifies the body, or does so 
any more than any other sort of physical labor, has been contested in the literature. 
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Feminist theorists and activists have vitalized another array of ethical 
concerns that might support criminalization of prostitution, and some of these 
now play a strong role in popular moral thinking. An especially important 
example involves the role of consent in sex. Where consent played a crucial 
but undeveloped role in liberal sexual ethics (insofar as consent was treated as 
a marker for the autonomous choice privileged by liberalism), feminist theory 
has “refurbished” the meaning of consent84 in the context of sexual conduct in 
a way that brings to the fore ethical concerns traditional liberals did not 
normally recognize. Thus, where traditional liberals presumed that adult 
women who did not object to sex (in narrowly defined ways) “consented” to 
sex, feminist theorists have highlighted that the social, economic, and 
psychological conditions under which such “consent” is given degrade or 
destroy its consent value. While it would be perverse to morally condemn the 
“consenter” in such cases, there would be strong moral objections to the 
conduct of the other party, and thus strong moral objections to permitting the 
sexual conduct. At least some of these ideas about the role of consent in sex 
now seem to have become part of popular moral thought. 
This refurbished understanding of consent may offer an explanation for the 
non-criminalization of pornographic acting. Under some accounts of the 
production of pornography, those who act in pornography, and especially 
women who act in pornography, do not do so under conditions of legitimate 
consent. Rather, they are driven to pornography by outright violence and 
threats and/or economic desperation, from backgrounds of abuse and addiction, 
in a cultural context that strips women of other opportunities and channels 
them to sexual subordination, such that participation is “chosen” only because 
no other or better choices are available. If so, they are not consenting 
participants in the sexual encounter and are best understood as victims rather 
than perpetrators. As a result, their conduct is not a crime. 
This view does not, however, explain the criminalization of prostitution. If 
women who participate in pornography do not exercise legitimate consent, 
women who engage in prostitution do not do so either. Accounts of 
pornography showing that choice is eviscerated in pornography commonly 
show that the same pressures and conditions are at work in prostitution. Thus, 
to the extent that women participating in pornography are victims rather than 
perpetrators of a moral wrong, women who engage in prostitution are also 
victims of moral wrongs. If so, this view would straightforwardly support 
criminalizing exploitation of the prostitute (i.e. by the client, pimp, or brothel 
owner), but it would not support criminalizing prostitution itself (since the 
prostitute’s lack of consent would normally show the prostitute the victim of 
the encounter). Thus, this view does not successfully explain the criminal law’s 
divergent treatment of pornographic acting and prostitution. 
 
 84. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 814. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2016] WHY PORNOGRAPHY IS NOT PROSTITUTION 267 
In a time of rapidly changing and plural norms about sex, it would be 
overreaching to resolve whether contemporary norms can supply a plausible 
moralistic rationale for the divergent treatment of prostitution and 
pornographic acting. Nevertheless, this first-cut survey of possible moralistic 
rationales suggests that there is not an easy or obvious explanation in 
contemporary moral norms regarding sexual conduct. On the contrary, it 
appears that several of the most accessible norms today cut in the other 
direction, favoring similar rather than divergent treatment of prostitution and 
pornographic acting. 
C. Harm-Based Rationales for Divergent Treatment 
While there has long been controversy about whether criminal prohibitions 
can be grounded in purely moralistic rationales like those discussed above, it is 
generally accepted that the harmfulness of conduct can support its criminal 
prohibition. Consistent with this view, criminalization of prostitution has often 
been justified by reference to the harms that prostitution causes, including 
harms to the prostitute and harms that prostitutes cause to others (including 
harms to clients, clients’ partners and families, the broader community, and 
women collectively).85 Can such harms justify the law’s divergent treatment of 
prostitution and pornographic acting?86 
1. Harms to the Prostitute 
Some rationales for criminalizing prostitution point to the harms that 
prostitutes suffer as a result of engaging in prostitution. Prostitution has been 
associated with a host of serious harms to individual prostitutes. Working in 
prostitution can result in contracting sexually transmitted diseases, or it can 
lead to unwanted pregnancy. Prostitutes are subjected to brutal physical 
violence at the hands of clients, pimps, and police, including murder, rape, and 
battery, at rates much higher than non-prostitutes.87 Those who work in 
 
 85. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 827 (discussing “external effects” rationales for 
criminalizing prostitution).  
 86. At least one court has thought so. Paulino, supra note 34, at 19 (“[T]he two industries 
[prostitution and pornography] are not similarly situated because the prostitution laws aim to 
abate the underlying social ills accompanying brothels, ills which are not perpetuated when 
mammoth media companies film adult entertainment. . . . [P]rostitution brings with it a host of ills 
including AIDS, venereal diseases, drugs, pimping, loan sharking, physical abuse and rape.”).  
 87. MacKinnon, Trafficking, supra note 1, at 277 n.16 (noting research showing that 
“[h]omicide of women in prostitution vastly exceeds that of any other cohort in the United 
States”); id. at 282 n.31 (discussing research concluding “that prostituted women were ‘the most 
raped class of women in history,’” citing sources suggesting that “40% to 85% of women 
reported being raped in prostitution,” “70% by clients an average of 31.3 times”); id. at 282 n.32 
(“The vast majority of prostituted people report being physically assaulted in prostitution,” citing 
sources suggesting “over half beaten once per month or more,” “an average of 103 times per year 
by pimps and johns.”); Kaethe Morris Hoffer, A Response to Sex-Trafficking Chicago Style: 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
268 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:243 
prostitution endure psychological suffering—said to include depression, self-
hatred, post-traumatic stress disorders, mental illness, and impairment of 
sexual pleasure—at much higher rates than non-prostitutes.88 They fall into 
addiction,89 economic marginalization, and social stigma and 
marginalization.90 As Carlin Meyer writes, “Prostitution leaves thousands upon 
thousands of women diseased, brutalized, self-hating, dependent and 
vulnerable.”91 While there is some dispute as to whether prostitutes in some 
sectors face these same risks, most research appears to confirm that most 
prostitutes are at high risk for many of these harms. 
These harms provide compelling reasons to criminalize conduct associated 
with the prostitution industry, for they link the industry to devastating harms to 
vast numbers of individual prostitutes. It is not as clear, however, that they 
provide compelling reasons to criminalize the act of prostitution itself. This 
catalog of harms seems to show the prostitute to be a victim, not a perpetrator; 
if so, punishment adds to, rather than mitigating, the prostitute’s suffering. Of 
course, we sometimes criminalize conduct paternalistically to deter people 
from engaging in conduct that may endanger them. Doing so is always 
controversial but even more so in the case of prostitution, as most research 
shows that most prostitutes come to prostitution from desperation and abuse, 
making the threat of criminal sanction for engaging in prostitution ineffectual 
and perverse. Thus, not surprisingly, most critics of the prostitution industry 
who point to the harm it causes prostitutes—including most feminists—do not 
advocate criminalizing prostitution itself.92 Rather, they favor punishing those 
who exploit prostitutes (such as clients and pimps). 
 
Follow the Sisters, Speak Out, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1831, 1837–40 (2010) (discussing research 
showing pervasive violence against Chicago prostitutes). 
 88. MacKinnon, Trafficking, supra note 1, at 286. (“[P]rostituted women’s measured level of 
post-traumatic stress (‘PTSD’) is equivalent to that of combat veterans or victims of torture or 
raped women.”); Richards, supra note 4, at 1221 (“[V]arious kinds of harms have been adduced, 
including . . . mental deficiency or neurotic impairment [and] incapacity for orgasm.”).  
 89. MacKinnon, Trafficking, supra note 1, at 287 (“Often women in prostitution are addicted 
to drugs; many use substantial amounts of alcohol, too, as a result of what they are going through. 
Sometimes the drugs are pushed on them by pimps to addict them.”); see id. at 287 n.51 
(surveying studies showing very high rates of drug use among prostitutes, attributing use to 
working in prostitution).  
 90. Id. at 306–07, 307 n.125 (discussing social stigma associated with working as a 
prostitute). 
 91. Carlin Meyer, Decriminalizing Prostitution: Liberalization or Dehumanization?, 1 
CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 105, 112 (1993); see also Law, supra note 3, at 533 (summarizing 
research showing very high rates of violence against prostitutes, including research showing that 
eighty percent of prostitutes report physical assaults and that prostitutes “are murdered . . . at a 
rate forty times the national average”). 
 92. See Law, supra note 3, at 532–33 (regarding prostitution, “[f]eminists are divided” on 
matters of fact, vision, and principle, but “all feminists . . . condemn the current legal policy 
enforcing criminal sanctions against women who offer sex in exchange for money”). 
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Nor do these harms to prostitutes provide a convincing rationale for the 
divergent treatment of prostitution and pornographic acting. On the contrary, it 
appears that those who act in pornography face many of the same threats that 
prostitutes face. Moreover, it may be that pornography itself drives demand for 
prostitution, and is thus responsible for harms associated with prostitution, 
including harms to prostitutes. Indeed, the worlds of pornography and 
prostitution appear highly permeable (with some participants participating in 
both activities), and pornography may serve as a gateway to prostitution.93 If 
so, those who act in pornography may thereby expose themselves to all the 
harms associated with prostitution. Moreover, pornography may increase the 
incidence of dangerous activities in prostitution by depicting dangerous 
sexualized conduct on film; if so, acting in pornography is yet again implicated 
in the harms that prostitutes face.94 In short, those who engage in pornographic 
acting appear to face many of the same threats that prostitutes face, and their 
conduct may increase the harms that prostitutes face. If so, the harms 
prostitutes face do not appear to support divergent treatment of prostitution and 
pornographic acting. 
2. Harms to Their Partners 
Arguments in favor of criminalizing prostitution sometimes point to the 
harms prostitutes cause to their clients. The most commonly mentioned danger 
to the client is infection with a sexually transmitted disease (STD).95 More 
attenuated client harms might include negative psychological consequences of 
engagement in impersonal sex with prostitutes, such as distraction from more 
substantial and fulfilling sexual relationships, or from important existing 
relationships and responsibilities. 
It is not clear, however, that these sorts of harms provide plausible 
explanations for the criminalization of prostitution. There is significant 
empirical uncertainty about the extent to which prostitutes transmit STDs to 
clients, with research suggesting the risk has been significantly overstated;96 
 
 93. MacKinnon, Pornography, supra note 1, at 1000 (a former participant “told how 
pornography was used to train and season young girls in prostitution,” others reported that 
“pornography was made of them in prostitution”). 
 94. Id. (“Pornography is documented to create demand for specific acts, including dangerous 
and demeaning ones . . . .”).  
 95. See Law, supra note 3, at 546 (assumption is prostitutes are primary transmitters of 
STDs).  
 96. See, e.g., Carol Leigh, A First Hand Look at the San Francisco Task Force Report on 
Prostitution, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 59, 69–70 (1999) (San Francisco prostitution task force 
report noting lack of evidence that prostitutes contract or transmit HIV at higher rates than the 
general population); Law, supra note 3, at 546–52 (summarizing research supporting conclusion 
that prostitutes are not “primary transmitters of venereal disease”); Richards, supra note 4, at 
1218 (“[T]he disappearance of prostitution today would still leave about ninety-five percent of the 
cases of venereal disease intact.”). 
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clients presumably have significant ability to control their exposure to such 
transmission; and the most apt solution to the STD problem might be legal 
regulation directed at preventing STD transmission rather than wholesale 
prohibition of prostitution. The more attenuated psychological harms seem 
neither especially likely to occur nor much present in popular discourse about 
prostitution. Thus, it seems implausible that these sorts of harms fully explain 
the current criminalization of prostitution. 
Moreover, even if these harms did explain the criminalization of 
prostitution, they do not provide a very solid rationale for the law’s divergent 
treatment of pornographic acting. Transmission of STDs has long been a 
salient concern in the pornography industry, as reflected by a recent spate of 
legislation meant to reduce the transmission of STDs among pornographic 
actors. If such concern explains criminalization of prostitution, it should also 
lead to criminalization of pornographic acting. Alternatively, if legislated STD 
regulations are sufficient safeguards for pornographic acting, they should be 
adequate for prostitution as well. Either way, these concerns call for similar 
treatment of these two conducts, not divergence. The more attenuated 
psychological harms that might befall clients of prostitutes seem equally a 
concern in the context of pornographic acting, where the actors engage in sex 
that appears equally impersonal, and they should therefore be at similar risk of 
distraction from more substantial relationships and other responsibilities. Thus, 
the harms that prostitution purportedly causes to the client do not seem to 
supply a plausible rationale for the law’s divergent treatment of prostitution 
and pornographic acting. They neither convincingly explain the criminalization 
of prostitution nor offer a good ground for distinguishing prostitution from 
pornographic acting. 
3. Ripple Effects: Harms to Clients’ Families 
Prostitution may also cause harm to more closely connected third parties. 
For example, it may cause harm to the client’s families. If an STD is 
transmitted to the client, the client may pass that disease on to other sexual 
partners (spouses or otherwise). If the client is distracted from relationships 
with partners and family, partners and family may feel abandonment, 
loneliness, or other sorts of loss. Partners may experience the client’s 
engagement with the prostitute as infidelity or betrayal, and suffer emotionally 
as a result. The prostitute’s engagement with the client may lead to the end of 
the relationships with spouses or other partners,97 causing psychological, 
emotional, and economic harm to those partners and any children or others 
who depend upon the relationship. 
 
 97. Richards, supra note 4, at 1243–44 (noting but rejecting the “empirical claim that the 
toleration of prostitution makes marriage less stable”).  
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Again, however, it is not clear that concerns about these sorts of harms 
plausibly explain either the criminalization of prostitution, or the divergent 
treatment of pornographic acting. For one thing, the identified threats are all 
(more or less equally) possible consequences of any sort of infidelity, whether 
it involves a prostitute or not, yet other sorts of infidelity are generally not 
considered criminal today. Adultery and fornication statutes have been 
repealed in many jurisdictions, left in desuetude in the others, and generally 
called into constitutional doubt by Lawrence. (While the popular imagination 
has appeared to believe that infidelity with a prostitute is more likely to lead to 
STD transmission than other sorts of infidelity, the empirical evidence calls 
this idea into question,98 and, in any event, all sorts of infidelity have been 
treated as significant threats of STD transmission.) Indeed, prostitution 
arguably poses less threat of some of these harms than other forms of 
infidelity, insofar as it is less likely to result in ongoing romantic affairs (and 
thus less likely to be discovered, and less likely to motivate the client to 
abandon partners or families).99 For another thing, prostitution obviously need 
not impact partners/families at all, as some clients have neither, and many 
partners/families presumably need not and do not learn of the client’s 
interaction with the prostitute, foreclosing potential psychological harms. Thus, 
that some clients may have partners/families—some of whom may learn of the 
client’s interaction with the prostitute, some of whom may experience such 
psychological harms—seems like a fairly attenuated basis for criminalization 
of prostitution. 
If concerns about such harms do motivate criminalization of prostitution, 
do they also make sense of the divergent treatment of pornographic acting? 
The actor who engages in sex for film seems more or less as likely to transmit 
STDs to a sex partner, and thus to put that person’s partners at risk, as the 
prostitute. This might suggest that prostitution and pornographic acting are 
similar in a relevant way. On the other hand, it may be that the person who has 
sex for film is expected to have fewer partners, and thus to create less total risk 
to partners and families than the prostitute. Likewise, the actor who has sex for 
film might be seen as a catalyst to the other actor’s infidelity and thus the cause 
of psychological harm to the other actor’s partners. But, again, with fewer 
partners the expected harm may be less. Moreover, the pornographic context 
 
 98. Leigh, supra note 96, at 69–70 (San Francisco prostitution task force report noting lack 
of evidence that prostitutes contract or transmit HIV at higher rates than the general population); 
Law, supra note 3, at 546–52 (summarizing research supporting conclusion that prostitutes are 
not “primary transmitters of venereal disease”); Richards, supra note 4, at 1218 (“[T]he 
disappearance of prostitution today would still leave about ninety-five percent of the cases of 
venereal disease intact.”). 
 99. Adopting views like this one, “St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and many others” have 
thought “prostitution may have beneficial effects on the stability of marriage.” Richards, supra 
note 4, at 1243–44. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
272 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:243 
may be relevant here. Perhaps we expect that the partners of pornographic 
actors will normally be aware of and at peace with the actor’s pornographic 
acting and thus less likely to suffer psychological harm. Thus, pornographic 
acting might seem to cause less expected harm to partners/families than 
prostitution. 
Nevertheless, these possible harms to partners/families are an 
unsatisfactory explanation for the law’s divergent treatment of prostitution and 
pornographic acting. As noted, these harms seem like a fairly attenuated basis 
for criminalization of prostitution, especially given the prevalence of other 
forms of infidelity that are more or less likely to cause such harms but are not 
treated as criminal. If so, they are poor candidates to explain the divergence at 
issue. Moreover, while there may be relevant differences in the anticipated 
harm to partners/families in prostitution and pornographic acting, they appear 
to be fairly speculative differences in degree—a shaky foundation for such a 
significant difference in legal treatment. 
4. Harms to the Community 
More broadly, prostitution may cause harm to the communities in which 
prostitution is practiced. Transmission of STDs is often mentioned in the 
context.100 So too are the “nuisance” effects of street-level prostitution 
markets,101 including increased foot and auto traffic, offensive litter (such as 
condoms and drug paraphernalia), upsetting encounters with street-level 
prostitutes, “fostering of other crimes, the deterioration of neighborhoods, or 
even the decline of the moral climate of the community.”102 
 
 100. See, e.g., Jo Phoenix, Governing Prostitution: New Formations, Old Agendas, 22 CAN. 
J.L. & SOC’Y 73, 81–82 (2007) (in popular discourse regarding prostitution in the United 
Kingdom during the 1980s and 1990s, “sex workers were increasingly being identified as a 
bridge between the undeserving and diseased few and the healthy, moral many. . . . [S]ex workers 
were always and already potential reservoirs for disease. . . . In the mid-nineteenth century [they 
were seen as] a threat to the sexual health of the nation”); Chamallas, supra note 3, at 827 
(including STD transmission among external effects that might be taken to justify criminalizing 
prostitution); Law, supra note 3, at 545–53 (suggesting concern that prostitute transmission of 
STDs has played a critical role in supporting criminalization of prostitution in an era when most 
other legal regulation of consensual sexual activity has been repealed or fallen into desuetude). 
There has, however, been disagreement about the extent to which prostitution in fact accelerates 
the spread of STDs.  
 101. DeFranco & Stellato, supra note 10, at 579–80; Leigh, supra note 96, at 80–81 (San 
Francisco prostitution task force report noting vocal complaints about street prostitution from 
neighborhood activists and business groups, including complaints about “drug paraphernalia and 
condoms left on the streets, congested traffic, excessive noise and other nuisances”). 
 102. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 827; see also Richards, supra note 4, at 1215–17 (discussing 
and critiquing the claim that prostitution generates crime, including “theft and assault of patrons, 
trafficking in heroin, and the enlarged scope of organized crime operations”). 
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At first glance, these appear to be solid rationales for criminalizing 
prostitution, and for the divergent treatment of prostitution and pornographic 
acting. While there is some uncertainty about the extent to which prostitution 
causes these sorts of community harms103 (especially with respect to 
propagation of STDs),104 even pro-prostitution advocates have acknowledged 
that street-level prostitution markets can dismay and mobilize other community 
members.105 Moreover, pornographic actors engaging in pornographic acting 
are not associated with these sorts of harms.106 Thus, these community-level 
harms might plausibly explain why prostitution is a crime and why 
pornographic acting is treated differently. 
When more closely scrutinized, however, this explanation appears less 
plausible. For one thing, while street-level prostitution markets may produce 
nuisance-like community-level harms, most prostitution does not occur in 
street-level prostitution markets107—many prostitutes work in off-street venues 
(such as massage parlors and strip clubs) or work off-street as escorts,108 and 
easy internet advertising has enabled many independent prostitutes to solicit 
clients off-street—and thus does not produce these community-level harms. 
Neighborhood-harm explanations, then, do not adequately explain why we 
criminalize prostitution as a whole rather than focusing the criminal sanction 
on on-street prostitution, or on prostitution associated with the community-
level harms at issue. 
For another thing, even if prostitution sometimes causes these community-
level harms, it is not clear why criminalizing prostitution itself is the 
appropriate remedy. Indeed, there are well-known alternatives that are better 
tailored to the harms at issue. One is the approach taken in many Western 
 
 103. Chamallas, supra note 3, at 827 (“[T]he limited amount of empirical evidence on the 
external effects of prostitution does not provide a convincing case for criminalization.”). 
 104. See, e.g., Leigh, supra note 96, at 69–70 (San Francisco prostitution task force report 
noting lack of evidence that prostitutes contract or transmit HIV at higher rates than the general 
population); Law, supra note 3, at 546–52 (summarizing research supporting conclusion that 
prostitutes are not “primary transmitters of venereal disease”); Richards, supra note 4, at 1218 
(“[T]he disappearance of prostitution today would still leave about ninety-five percent of the 
cases of venereal disease intact.”). 
 105. See, e.g., Leigh, supra note 96, at 66, 80–81.  
 106. In fact, however, anti-pornography advocates do associate pornography with a variety of 
communal harms. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 4, at 302 (quoting 1980 Commission Report 
304–05 (pornography is harmful “because it causes some people to commit acts of sexual 
violence, because it causes promiscuity, because it encourages sexual relations outside of 
marriage, because it promotes so-called ‘unnatural’ sexual practices, or because it leads men to 
treat women as existing solely for the sexual satisfaction of men”)).  
 107. See Law, supra note 3, at 529 (“Although streetwalkers are the most visible and familiar 
[prostitutes], they compromise only ten to twenty percent of all prostitutes.”). 
 108. See id. (describing “[t]he largest group of prostitutes, high-class ‘call girls’ or ‘escorts’” 
and another cohort, “women who work in various off-street settings, including massage parlors, 
brothels, hotels and bars”). 
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European nations, where public advertising and soliciting are crimes, but 
prostitution itself is not.109 Such regulatory schemes make criminal the conduct 
that produces the community-level harm, leaving prostitution that does not 
produce such harm legal. Another approach is to use zoning regulation to 
confine prostitution to locales where community-level harms are not a 
concern.110 This, of course, is the approach taken in many American 
communities regarding other sex-related industries associated with 
community-level harms, including strip clubs and pornographic theatres. 
Finally, many of the nuisance-style harms involved here may themselves 
be catalyzed or increased by criminalization of prostitution. For example, some 
argue that criminalization of prostitution generates “these evils by forcing 
prostitutional activities into the clandestine criminal underground, the 
covertness of which breeds incidental crime” and other problems.111 
Thus, while prostitution and pornographic acting can be distinguished on 
the grounds that prostitution sometimes causes community-level harms that 
pornographic acting does not, such harms are a tenuous explanation for the 
criminalization of prostitution generally, and thus a poor explanation for the 
divergent treatment of prostitution and pornographic acting. 
Prostitution has also been associated with another sort of community harm: 
coercion and trafficking of women into prostitution.112 To the extent that 
prostitution drives coercion and trafficking, this appears to be a powerful 
rationale for criminalizing prostitution. Again, however, this appears to mean 
punishing the victims of the offensive behavior, and this seems perverse. 
Better-tailored law would punish the trafficking itself, and those who 
knowingly take advantage of trafficking rather than acts of prostitution. Thus, 
harms associated with trafficking may not adequately justify criminalizing 
prostitution. Moreover, even if they did, they would not supply a rationale for 
the divergent treatment of prostitution and pornographic acting, for 
pornography is also a driver of coercion and trafficking. Thus, if criminalizing 
prostitution is an appropriate step toward remedying trafficking, criminalizing 
pornographic acting should be too. 
 
 109. See, e.g., id. at 526 (noting that the “United States is unique among the nations of 
Western Europe and the British Commonwealth in imposing and enforcing criminal sanctions on 
people who offer sexual services for money”); id. at 554–55 (describing the British and Canadian 
approach, under which prostitution is not a crime, but public solicitation is).  
 110. Id. at 558–59 (noting an Australian commission report suggesting use of zoning 
principles to address neighborhood concerns about prostitution); Richards, supra note 4, at 1282–
84 (discussing use of zoning schemes in continental Europe and their possible use in America). 
 111. Richards, supra note 4, at 1216. 
 112. MacKinnon, Trafficking, supra note 1, at 304 (“[E]xperience shows that when 
prostitution is legalized, trafficking goes through the roof.”). 
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5. Harms to Women Collectively 
Contemporary feminism—especially radical feminism—has also 
emphasized that prostitution causes harms to women collectively. Along these 
lines, writes Noah Zatz, “Radical feminists have emphasized the way that 
institutions that may encourage men to view women as objects for sexual use 
may contribute to violence, harassment, and denigration directed toward 
women.”113 Holly Fechner describes the “radical feminist” view that 
prostitution “allows men to use women as sexual objects, [in] a rape-like 
mentality,” thereby making “all women objects for men’s use and abuse . . . 
reducing all of us to meat to be bought, sold, traded, used, discarded, degraded, 
ridiculed, humiliated, maimed, tortured, and all too often, murdered for sex.”114 
On grounds like these, some have characterized prostitutes as “the ‘Uncle 
Toms’ of gender.”115 
These are potentially compelling reasons to criminalize aspects of the 
prostitution industry, for they link the institution of prostitution to pervasive 
and devastating harms to women collectively. It is not as clear, however, that 
they provide compelling reasons to criminalize the act of prostitution itself. As 
most feminists have observed, prostitutes themselves often seem to be victims, 
rather than perpetrators, of the dynamics at issue, such that it is perverse to 
punish them. (On a common view, the appropriate approach is to punish those 
who exploit prostitutes, including pimps and clients, rather than punishing the 
prostitutes themselves.) Such objections might be overcome by characterizing 
prostitutes as Uncle Toms, implicating them as self-serving contributors to the 
collective harm; but this characterization seems unrealistic, especially given 
the extensive evidence that most prostitutes come to prostitution under at least 
very difficult circumstances. Thus, it seems problematic to justify 
criminalization of prostitution on the basis of collective harms to women. 
Moreover, even if collective harms do justify criminalization of 
prostitution, they do not appear to plausibly explain the divergent treatment of 
prostitution and pornographic acting. On the contrary, pornography has 
normally been seen as similarly implicated in the collective harms associated 
 
 113. Zatz, supra note 1, at 292.  
 114. See Holly B. Fechner, Three Stories of Prostitution in the West: Prostitutes’ Groups, 
Law and Feminist “Truth,” 4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 26, 48 (1994); Shaver, supra note 83, at 
141 (attributing the view that engaging in prostitution “harms the collectivity” of women to 
“radical feminists;” maintaining that one version of this view holds that engaging in prostitution 
“publicly affirms the law of male sex-right” and serves as “public acknowledgement” that men 
are “women’s sexual masters”); Zatz, supra note 1, at 288 (attributing to the radical feminism 
view that “prostitution reinforces dominant sexual roles in which men violently use women’s 
sexuality for their own pleasure and reproduction, and women are constructed as sexual servants 
for men”). 
 115. Meyer, supra note 91, at 112 (quoting Laurie Shrage, Should Feminists Oppose 
Prostitution, 99 ETHICS 347 (1989)).  
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with prostitution. The same charges that have been leveled at prostitution—that 
it makes “all women objects for men’s use and abuse . . . reducing all of us to 
meat to be bought, sold, traded, used, discarded, degraded, ridiculed, 
humiliated, maimed, tortured, and all too often, murdered for sex”116 —have 
been leveled at pornography.117 Indeed, the mass consumption of pornographic 
media may make pornography an even more potent vector for many of these 
effects. Moreover, it may be that pornography itself contributes to all the 
harms associated with prostitution in that pornography “creates demand for 
prostitution.”118 To the extent that this is true, the harms generated by 
prostitution and pornography genuinely collapse together, making any 
collective harm-based distinction between prostitution and pornographic acting 
difficult to sustain. 
Thus, while prostitution may be an important source of collective harm to 
women, this collective harm does not plausibly explain the divergent treatment 
of prostitution and pornographic acting. It is a problematic explanation for 
criminalizing prostitution (rather than exploitation of prostitution), and it offers 
no clear ground for distinguishing between prostitution and pornographic 
acting. On the contrary, it seems to offer powerful reasons to treat prostitution 
and pornographic acting similarly under the law. 
IV.  EXPLANATIONS FOR DIVERGENT TREATMENT 
This Article has argued that the law’s divergent treatment of prostitution 
and pornographic acting seems strange, and that neither the courts’ reasons nor 
conventional criteria for criminalization present fully plausible rationales for 
the divergence. In this part, this Article leaves behind the search for a 
justification and looks instead for an explanation, asking whether there are 
social or cultural phenomena that might help us understand why the law makes 
 
 116. See Fechner, supra note 114, at 48; Shaver, supra note 83, at 141 (attributing the view 
that engaging in prostitution “harms the collectivity” of women to “radical feminists;” 
maintaining that one version of this view holds that engaging in prostitution “publically affirms 
the law of male sex-right” and serves as “public acknowledgement” that men are “women’s 
sexual masters”); Zatz, supra note 1, at 288 (attributing to the radical feminism view that 
“prostitution reinforces dominant sexual roles in which men violently use women’s sexuality for 
their own pleasure and reproduction, and women are constructed as sexual servants for men”). 
 117. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 4, at 302 (quoting 1980 Commission Report 304-05 
(pornography is harmful “because it causes some people to commit acts of sexual violence, 
because it causes promiscuity, because it encourages sexual relations outside of marriage, because 
it promotes so-called ‘unnatural’ sexual practices, or because it leads men to treat women as 
existing solely for the sexual satisfaction of men”)); see also ANDREA DWORKIN, 
PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 207–09 (1989); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, 
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 206 (1989) (Dworkin and MacKinnon contend that 
pornography interferes with women’s participation in the political process, undermines women’s 
abilities to engage in First Amendment expression). 
 118. MacKinnon, Pornography, supra note 1, at 999. 
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this strange distinction. While such explanations do not justify the state of the 
law, they may help us understand and address some of the phenomena that 
shape it. 
One possible explanation looks to the political process. On this 
explanation, pro-pornography actors influence the political process more 
effectively than pro-prostitution actors, and this difference in influence is 
manifest in more accommodating legal regulation of pornographic activities. 
Though this explanation has some appeal, however, it does not satisfyingly 
explain the way the popular discourse differentiates prostitution and 
pornographic acting. 
A fuller explanation looks to persistent cultural folk theories about gender 
and sex. On these theories, prostitution threatens to taint or corrupt male 
consumers in a way that pornography does not. It does so because it requires 
direct physical involvement of the male consumer with the female provider, 
contact that exposes the male consumer to an array of contaminations—not just 
physical, but moral and social—that folk theories of sexuality associate with 
physical intimacy between male and female. Anxiety about these 
contaminations supplies the missing piece in explaining the divergent 
treatment of prostitution and pornographic acting. 
A. Political Process Explanation 
One possible explanation points to the political process. On this view, 
pornography and its participants may be better protected under the law because 
pro-pornography actors have been more effective participants in the political 
process than pro-prostitution actors. 
At first glance, this may be a promising idea. Some pro-pornography actors 
look more likely to be effective participants in the political process than their 
pro-prostitution parallels. While both pornography and prostitution are multi-
billion dollar industries, wealth appears more concentrated and stable in the 
pornography industry, while it is diffuse and unstable in the prostitution 
industry. In pornography, large production companies—“Goliath 
corporations”119—control significant portions of the industry’s wealth, and 
these companies persist over time. In prostitution, in contrast, there are no 
corporations of similar size and duration. On the contrary, prostitution appears 
to be a highly diffuse industry, in which most actors work on their own or in 
small groups, controlling little wealth, persisting only for short times, and 
having no more than local influence. Compared to pimps, prostitutes, and 
brothel owners, then, pornography’s large production companies are more 
likely to be effective players in the political process, as they control more 
 
 119. Paulino, supra note 3, at 19 (defendant in prostitution case complains that prosecutors 
focus on escort services while ignoring “Goliath corporations” that pay actors to engage in sex). 
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wealth, persist long enough to become experienced actors, and can more easily 
engage in collective action with other similarly situated entities. 
This might help explain the divergent legal treatment of prostitution and 
pornographic acting. Perhaps prostitution remains illegal because pro-
prostitution actors are too poor, inexperienced, and diffuse to effectively 
influence the political process and the making of law. They are not effective 
advocates for decriminalization. In contrast, pornographic acting is not illegal 
because pro-pornography actors are sufficiently wealthy, experienced, and 
coordinated to effectively influence the political process and the making of 
law. They are effective advocates for decriminalization. 
This is a plausible explanation for differences in the legal regimes 
governing pornography and prostitution, but there are some reasons to question 
whether it fully explains the riddle at issue. 
First, it may overstate the relevant differences between the pornography 
and prostitution industries. In particular, it may fail to recognize the diffusion 
of the pornography industry. Today, that industry appears to be extraordinarily 
diffuse. Lone individuals and small groups can easily produce pornographic 
material using inexpensive equipment (such as personal digital cameras and 
camera phones), and that material can easily be distributed and marketed to 
enormous audiences via the Internet. And while the diffusion of the industry 
today does reflect relatively recent technological advances significantly 
reducing the cost of production and distribution, the pornography industry has 
long been populated by large numbers of small production entities, including 
short-lived and low-revenue entities. This is not and has not been the sort of 
industry normally known for significant influence in the political process. 
At the same time, it may fail to recognize the potential for pro-prostitution 
political action. In theory, prostitutes might organize and act collectively just 
as other interest groups do. Indeed, prostitutes have sometimes done so. In San 
Francisco, some prostitutes participate in the pro-prostitution activist group 
COYOTE. In other countries, “prostitutes have organized to lobby for health 
insurance, old age pensions, and other benefits.”120 Moreover, the assumption 
that actors in the prostitution industry are uniformly poor and without influence 
may be historically naïve: “[T]he real profiteers from prostitution have been 
wealthy property owners and their ilk . . . [influential citizens who] made 
[their] fortune[s] buying and selling brothel real estate.”121 There may also be 
other actors who could work effectively on behalf of prostitutes or prostitution. 
For example, health care providers and prostitutes might find common ground 
around issues pertaining to STDs, drug addiction, mental health, or 
homelessness. Along these lines, the health care industry in Nevada appears to 
have profited from the legalization of prostitution in some Nevada counties, 
 
 120. Meyer, supra note 91, at 106. 
 121. Id. at 115. 
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insofar as legalization has been accompanied by regulations requiring constant 
STD testing for prostitutes. Indeed, the more powerful actors in the legalized 
sex industries (such as pornography) would appear to be potential natural 
political allies for prostitutes as well. 
Second, this explanation may overstate the effectiveness of the 
pornography industry in shaping the legal regime. While some forms of 
pornography are legally protected, it is nevertheless true that pornography 
remains subject to significant legal constraints because obscene pornography is 
not constitutionally protected speech and is generally criminalized. Of course, 
not all pornography is obscene. Nevertheless, courts do continue to find some 
pornography obscene. Moreover, the standards for identifying obscene 
pornography are notoriously indeterminate.122 As a result, any maker of 
pornography must operate with some uncertainty as to whether the product 
produced is legally protected or not. This is a potentially onerous and 
restrictive uncertainty. It is also not a feature of the legal regime we would 
expect to see if the pornography industry was highly effective in the political 
process. 
Third, it may not adequately explain an important part of this riddle—
namely, that the legal divergence appears to track a divergence in social 
attitudes. It appears to be a common attitude today that prostitution is different 
from acting in a pornographic film, and that the difference is consistent with 
criminalizing prostitution while not criminalizing acting in a pornographic 
film.123 Of course, influential political actors can influence social attitudes and 
shape popular narratives; but it seems implausible that the pornography 
industry has deployed its political influence to generate these divergent social 
attitudes about pornography and prostitution. One reason this seems 
implausible is that some of the social attitudes at issue seem to have much 
deeper roots than that story would suggest, as discussed in the section that 
follows. 
This political process explanation, then, is appealing but not completely 
satisfactory. Putting aside the aspiration to harmonize seemingly anomalous 
doctrine, it points instead to social phenomena that might explain the 
development of inharmonious law. To the extent that it succeeds, it may 
undercut the legitimacy of the existing doctrine, showing that doctrine to be the 
 
 122. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 52, at 111–12 (“The Court has now put forward a set of 
doctrinal ‘rules’ that in the end do little more than obscure what is basically Stewart’s intuitive 
approach . . . advanc[ing] an incoherent formula . . . .”).  
 123. As anecdotal support for this claim, I have routinely surveyed my Vice Crime classes on 
their views about criminalizing various sorts of sexual conduct at the start of each semester. 
While my students have generally favored deregulation for most adult consensual sexual conduct, 
they generally favor deregulation of pornography at a higher rate than they favor deregulation of 
prostitution. Their comments during class discussions generally track this trend, as they more 
frequently and more readily articulate reasons to criminalize prostitution. 
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product not of principled reasoning, but of political influence in a dog-eat-dog 
world. It may also supply new rhetorical resources for arguing for law reform 
(irrational law reflecting differences in political power should be reformed in 
accord with rational principles). At the same time, because it does not seem to 
be a complete explanation for the legal anomaly at issue, it invites further 
investigation. 
B. Folk Theories of Gender, Sex, and Contamination 
A more complete explanation may be found in folk theories of sex and 
gender, and especially in cultural anxieties and narratives about the ways in 
which direct physical, sexual contact with women may corrupt men—not just 
physically but morally and socially. 
On this explanation, the divergence at issue springs from the interplay 
between a cultural commitment to sating male desire and a cultural anxiety 
about dangers to the man imagined to lie in direct sexual involvement with a 
woman. Prostitution and pornography both serve the function of satisfying the 
former (by providing mechanisms to sate male desire), but pornography does 
not threaten to taint or corrupt the male consumer in the way that prostitution 
does. It does not do so because it does not require the direct physical 
involvement of the male consumer with the female provider,124 and thus spares 
the male consumer from an array of physical, moral, and social dangers 
imagined to lie in such physical intimacy. From the perspective of these folk 
theories and anxieties, then, pornography strikes a more favorable balance 
between sating male desire and protecting men from potential corruption than 
prostitution does. This explains why the law privileges performing sex for 
money in pornography over doing so in prostitution. The former does not 
involve direct sexual contact with the male consumer, and thus it is not seen to 
threaten to taint or corrupt the male consumer in the way that the latter can. 
1. The Cultural Commitment to Sating Male Desire 
Traditionally, prostitution and pornography have both been considered 
mechanisms for sating male desire, with the vast majority of consumers of both 
products being men. While popular discourse and some research suggest that 
consumption of pornography by women is now increasing, popular discourse 
still associates pornography consumption primarily with men. Contemporary 
discourse also holds that women rarely patronize prostitutes. Thus, it remains 
 
 124. Of course, the sort of pornography at issue here does often involve direct physical, 
sexual involvement between a male and a female. As I argue below, however, the law’s primary 
concern appears to be about the male consumer (the prostitute’s client or the one who watches the 
pornography), such that the male participant in the pornography is rendered incidental or 
(paradoxically) invisible. He may be treated as already corrupted, or he may be sacrificed for the 
benefit of the masses of male consumers. 
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fair to see prostitution and pornography as mechanisms oriented to sating male 
desire. 
As the earlier discussion suggested, traditional norms for sexual conduct 
were ostensibly very restrictive (approving only marital and procreative sex), 
such that we might expect that such mechanisms for sating male desire would 
be condemned without reservation. While contemporary standards are 
considerably more flexible, continuing emphasis on intimacy and affectionate 
relationships with the potential to persist over time might also support 
restriction of such mechanisms. 
In fact, however, the truth is more complex. As has often been observed, 
strong narratives in our culture celebrate male desire and its satisfaction, even 
while suppressing female desire and satisfaction. Popular and folk psychology 
have supported these narratives by presenting men as naturally and inevitably 
sexually voracious and subject to passions that are difficult or impossible to 
cabin. Facilitating these narratives, sex norms include sexual double standards, 
under which expectations for men are very different than those for women. 
Such “double standards reserve sexual desire and pleasure for men” and treat 
“sexual pleasure [as] a male domain.”125 In conjunction with this double 
standard, men are “entitled to express their interest in and pursuit of sexual 
pleasure in ways women are not:” 
The proliferation of strip clubs, and their glorification in popular culture, is just 
one illustration of this differing entitlement; the prevalence of erectile 
dysfunction drug advertisements is another. Ratings systems in Hollywood 
also have their own double standard—limiting male nudity to a much greater 
extent than female nudity, providing heterosexual men with more opportunities 
to view the naked objects of their desire than are provided to heterosexual 
women and gay men.126 
As these narratives and double standards highlight, then, restrictive general 
norms for sexual conduct have long existed side-by-side with a cultural 
commitment to sating male sexual desire. Though at odds with general norms, 
that desire has nevertheless been celebrated as a virtue, naturalized as an 
intrinsic and immutable feature of masculinity and male psychology, and 
catered to in double standards that authorize men to deviate from general sex 
norms in ways not offered to women. 
Given the general norms restricting sexual conduct, we might expect to see 
mechanisms for sating male sexual desire—like prostitution and 
pornography—prohibited. On the other hand, given the cultural commitment to 
sating male sexual desire, we might expect to see such mechanisms tolerated. 
Why, then, do we find that one mechanism is prohibited (prostitution) while 
 
 125. Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex in and out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 
809, 840 (2010). 
 126. Id. 
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the other is tolerated (pornography)? The answer may lie in how this ancient 
cultural commitment interacts with a similarly ancient cultural anxiety—an 
anxiety about the ways in which direct sexual contact with a woman may taint 
or corrupt a man. 
2. The Threat Posed by Prostitution: Corruption Through Sexual Contact 
As we have seen, there are many different possible reasons to object to, 
restrict, and criminalize prostitution, including First Amendment, conceptual, 
moralistic, and harm-based rationales. Woven into this diverse array of 
objections is a subtle but persistent theme that helps us to distinguish 
prostitution from pornography: prostitution is seen as a vector for taint and 
corruption in a way that pornography is not. In this light, the prostitute is not 
the victim that contemporary policy analysis so often sees; instead, she is cast 
as a dangerous, toxic force, one that exploits the opportunity presented by male 
desire to transmit insidious contaminations to the male consumer. 
The most obvious examples of anxiety about taint and corruption appear in 
a standard harm-based analysis of prostitution. As we have seen, that analysis 
often emphasizes the potential transmittal of STDs. It points to the possibility 
that the prostitute will contract an STD, but it also emphasizes that the 
prostitute may transmit an STD to the client, that this may lead to infection of 
the client’s spouse or partners, and that ultimately prostitution threatens to 
infect the community as a whole. 
Though such concerns may often be motivated by sincere practical 
concerns about disease, they may at the same time be seen as metaphors 
capturing in tangible form a deeper, less practical fear. We can see this in the 
magnifying and nightmarish ways the danger has been perceived. As Jo 
Phoenix writes about United Kingdom prostitution discourse, “sex workers 
were increasingly being identified as a bridge between the undeserving and 
diseased few and the healthy, moral many. . . . [S]ex workers were always and 
already potential reservoirs for disease. . . . In the mid-nineteenth century [they 
were seen as] a threat to the sexual health of the nation.”127 We can see this, 
also, in the way anxiety about disease transmission continues to drive policy 
debate and lawmaking, despite substantial research showing that STD 
transmission through prostitution is much less prevalent than normally 
imagined and is only a small part of the STD problem. And we can see this in 
the stumbling history of STD control regulations in Nevada. There, legal 
prostitutes are subject to mandatory STD testing. Prostitutes’ reports suggest, 
however, that the testing regimen is so expensive, burdensome, and invasive of 
privacy that it motivates prostitutes to leave legal prostitution and return to 
illegal prostitution. If true, this raises the possibility that Nevada’s commitment 
to aggressive STD testing of legal prostitutes performs a symbolic rather than 
 
 127. See, e.g., Phoenix, supra note 100, at 81–82. 
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practical function. Not well-tailored to actually control STD transmission 
(since it drives prostitutes away from regulation entirely), such regulation 
instead symbolically expresses the more general anxiety that prostitutes must 
be intensively controlled less they pass on something bad through their touch. 
There are other aspects of the discourse about prostitution that suggest that 
the “infection” that prostitutes pass on may not be a literal one. Consider, for 
example, some of the other harms that are sometimes associated with 
prostitution. A common complaint about prostitution is that prostitution 
invades and then corrupts neighborhoods, transforming healthy, vibrant 
neighborhoods into decayed, decrepit, devitalized places—as though 
prostitution were a fungal infection rotting out a previously robust tree.128 
Another powerfully articulated concern about prostitution involves the harm it 
may do to women collectively. One of the ways in which it might do so 
resonates with these ideas of disease transmission in a vulnerable community: 
the woman who acts as a prostitute is objectified, and her objectification may 
result in other women being destructively objectified, with the destructive 
objectification spreading through the community like a plague. While each of 
these concerns about prostitution obviously carries great substantive weight, it 
also appears in each that the prostitute emerges as a font of something 
corrupting and destructive, something she may spread to others in devastating 
ways. In the discourse about prostitution, then, prostitutes pass on disease, but 
they pass on worse things, too. 
In this light, consider some of the other ways that cultural narratives about 
prostitutes cast them as corrupting the men who engage them. That prostitutes 
corrupt the men who have sex with them is a long-standing trope: “[W]e 
picture prostitutes as, amoral, corrupting harlots who corrupt our spouses.”129 
The nature of this corruption is not just physical. On the contrary, it is in 
significant ways corruption of the man’s virtue and his status. 
The idea that the prostitute corrupts the man’s moral virtue is common and 
straightforward. Traditional sexual norms hold that the man should not engage 
in sex unless it is marital and procreative. Contemporary norms favor sex that 
serves intimacy or an affectionate relationship. The prostitute offers to engage 
in sex with the man that violates these norms. The man is susceptible to this 
offer—on the traditional narrative—because he is naturally in the sway of a 
voracious and difficult to cabin sexual appetite.130 If the man gives in to this 
 
 128. For a related idea, see Shaver, supra note 83, at 135 (highlighting that nuisance-focused 
opposition to prostitution sometimes suggests “that legitimate activities and persons will be 
smeared by contiguity” to prostitution) (emphasis in original). 
 129. Michèle Alexandre, Sex, Drugs, Rock & Roll and Moral Dirigisme: Toward a 
Reformation of Drug and Prostitution Regulations, 78 UMKC L. REV. 101, 103 (2009). 
 130. See, e.g., Shaver, supra note 83, at 128 (noting that traditional prostitution laws 
exempted johns from prosecution in part because they were seen as driven by an “uncontrollable 
sexual drive”). 
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appetite, he offends against those norms. Morally speaking, he falls from 
grace. He is corrupted, then, not just in the sense that he may contract an 
infectious disease but also in the sense that he is morally degraded. 
While the physical and moral corruptions mentioned so far are prominent 
features of the conventional narratives about prostitution, the narrative is 
actually more complex than this, for these forms of corruption are 
accompanied by other sorts of corruption, too. Most importantly, prostitution is 
a vector for a sort of social degradation, tainting the consuming male by 
subordinating him to the already-degraded prostitute. In this sense, prostitution 
threatens to corrupt not just the male consumer’s body and virtue but also his 
social status and privilege. 
It is a common trope that prostitution is “seen as [a] direct threat to 
‘respectable’ members of the population.”131 That is, there is something 
distinctively threatening to a person’s respectability—his privileged social 
standing—about engagement with a prostitute. Several possible reasons for 
this emerge in discourse about prostitution. One is suggested by the quote from 
Jo Phoenix, above, in which “sex workers were increasingly being identified as 
a bridge between the undeserving” and the privileged.132 In Phoenix’s quote, 
prostitutes are literally a bridge for disease transmission; but in characterizing 
them as “the undeserving,”133 the quote suggests that in addition to 
transmitting their diseases, prostitutes might also transmit their degraded social 
statuses. In contact with the poor, desperate, marginalized, and dissolute 
prostitute, the consuming man is touched by and tainted with her poverty, 
desperation, marginalization, and dissolution. 
Why should engagement with the prostitute transfer social degradation to 
the consuming man? One possibility is that folk social psychology notoriously 
imagines that people who associate with each other mirror or “rub off” on each 
other (e.g. that “birds of a feather flock together,” that a person can be guilty 
by association, that we can be judged by the company we keep, etc.). Thus, the 
simple fact of association with a socially degraded person may diminish an 
otherwise privileged person’s social status. Moreover, this “rubbing off” effect 
is (in folk social psychology) especially powerful when it is involves sexually 
charged social exchanges, as though the sexual ingredient makes the 
transmission of unwanted social characteristics from one person to another 
especially viable. This trope has been especially vivid, for example, in “gay 
panic” narratives in which actual or perceived social and sexual overtures by 
gay men are seen as tainting the target with homosexuality and in anti-
miscegenatist horror at the loss of racial purity threatened by cross-racial 
flirtations. (It also appears, more mundanely, in cliché movie and TV stories 
 
 131. See, e.g., id. at 127.  
 132. Phoenix, supra note 100, at 81–82 
 133. Id. 
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about the visceral disgust and indignation high school outsiders face when 
making overtures to in-group members.) And this social contamination may be 
most powerful of all when actual physical contact occurs, as highlighted by 
(among other things) the socially pervasive myths about “cooties”—
indeterminate bad things that may be transferred between boys and girls by 
physical contact, shamefully tainting the recipient—that are so viscerally 
powerful to children approaching the age of sexually charged interpersonal 
relationships. In the context of this folk social psychology—in which one 
person may be contaminated by another person’s degraded social status 
through social and sexual association—a man who engages with a prostitute is 
in serious danger of taking on some of her degraded status through his direct 
physical, sexual association with her. 
Folk theories of sexuality suggest that degraded social status may be 
transferred through direct physical, sexual contact with the prostitute in another 
way, too. On those theories, the privileged man who engages with the degraded 
prostitute may be seen as yielding the power associated with his privilege to 
the prostitute. This is not to say that the client actually yields power to the 
prostitute, as the actual dynamics in the encounter almost surely involve a 
significant power difference in the other direction. Rather, it is to say that 
culturally common narratives about what happens in such an encounter may 
fuel the notion that the client yields power. On these narratives, the prostitute 
controls the client through her control over his experience of intense physical 
sensations and psychological experiences (including desire, pleasure, and 
vulnerability).134 Indeed, she may seem to exercise even more power than a 
sexual partner normally does, insofar as her own experience is unlikely to 
 
 134. This notion of the prostitute’s power over the client emerges in narratives from diverse 
perspectives. Some suggest that the patron may experience the prostitute as powerful in some 
sense (independent of whether the prostitute experiences any sort of power). See, e.g., Richards, 
supra note 4, at 1248 n.281 (quoting M. STEIN, LOVERS, FRIENDS, SLAVES . . . THE NINE MALE 
SEXUAL TYPES 313–14 (1974)) (patrons in one study assigned imagined roles to prostitutes, and 
“[t]he part they assigned the call girl corresponded to an idealized image of woman which exerted 
great power over their erotic imagination, and the correspondence was a source of excitement and 
pleasure”). More controversial narratives suggest that the prostitute herself may experience this 
sense of power. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 1, at 97 (quoting Lynn Sharon Chancer, 
Prostitution, Feminist Theory, and Ambivalence: Notes from the Sociological Underground, 37 
SOC. TEXT 143, 163 (1993)) (“[S]ome women describe a sense of . . . power in turning tricks . . . 
narcissistic enjoyment can emanate from seeing desire in someone’s eyes, knowing the 
dependency admitted by this attentiveness (however transient and fleeting), making him pay and 
in fact ‘getting paid’ from a sense of controlling the interaction . . . .”). It seems very plausible 
that the idea that the prostitute experiences power over the client is either a myth or a false-
consciousness. Nevertheless, the idea that the prostitute achieves power over the client may be 
sufficiently widespread (perhaps because it is consistent with common narratives about male and 
female sexuality generally) that it influences law and social attitudes about prostitution without 
regard to its empirical validity. 
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involve intense feelings of pleasure or openness, such that she may seem to be 
in control of both her own physical and psychological states at just the moment 
when her client relinquishes control of his, creating a perceived imbalance of 
power in her favor. Thus, on these folk beliefs, the man who engages with a 
prostitute might be seen as yielding the power associated with his privileged 
status to the prostitute. In yielding power to a person whose social status is 
already degraded, he subordinates himself to that person and therefore 
degrades his own privileged status. 
There is yet another way in which sexual engagement with the prostitute 
threatens to taint or corrupt the client’s social standing: it undermines his 
ability to take the benefit of certain privileged masculine roles and stereotypes. 
The client may aspire to privileged, distinctively masculine roles, roles that are 
accompanied by respectability and security, including the roles of husband, 
father, and protagonist in traditional romantic love.135 He may also enjoy the 
presumption that he has various positive traits stereotypically associated with 
masculinity, including rationality and self-control. Engagement with the 
prostitute threatens his access to these roles and presumptions. His engagement 
with the prostitute may disrupt or destroy his marriage,136 and thus prevent him 
from fulfilling the roles of husband and father. It may also draw him away 
from performance of the protagonist’s part in the celebrated dance of romantic 
love: “[P]rostitution blatantly violates the ideal of romantic love. The patron of 
the prostitute engages in sexual activity and experiences sexual release 
impersonally without the process of courting, testing, frustration, and personal 
idealization of the beloved that characterize romantic love.”137 His engagement 
with the prostitute may also strip him of the presumptions of rationality and 
self-control normally associated with the masculine stereotype. Caving in to 
anti-normative sexual desire, he shows himself irrational and sexually 
incontinent. He reveals that he is governed by carnal desire rather than reason. 
Thus, his engagement with the prostitute undercuts his access to privileged 
social roles and stereotypes, degrading his social status. He is, once again, 
socially tainted by his sexual engagement with the prostitute. 
Our cultural folklore about gender, sex, and prostitution, then, is loaded up 
with fearful stories and ideas about what can happen when a man has sexual 
contact with a woman, and especially when the woman has disfavored social 
 
 135. See, e.g., Shaver, supra note 83, at 128 (noting that traditional prostitution laws 
exempted johns from prosecution in part because of the “‘important social function they 
provided’ as husbands and fathers”). 
 136. On a common account, anti-prostitution laws reflect, in part, the concern that sex with 
partners outside the marriage is dangerous to the marriage. See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Strange 
Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 1253, 1270 (2009) (“The criminalization of adultery and prostitution . . . also were intended 
to protect and stabilize the marital family from the destructive influences of extramarital sex.”). 
 137. Richards, supra note 4, at 1244. 
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attributes. Of course, these stories and ideas do not supply a defensible 
justification for the criminalization of prostitution any more than childish 
folklore about cooties does. They may, however, help explain why the 
criminalization of prostitution persists so stubbornly despite the increasingly 
pervasive acceptance of feminist, libertarian, and sex-progressive views that 
might favor decriminalization. On these cultural folk tales, patronizing the 
prostitute threatens to taint and corrupt the male consumer. Through his 
contact with her, he may contract a disease; he may be degraded morally; and 
his social standing may be undermined. He may take on her sickness, 
depravation, and social degradation. The prostitute appears, now, not as a 
victim, but as a dangerous, toxic force—toxic not for the traditional moralistic 
reason that she is promiscuous or wanton, but because her undesirable 
attributes rub off on the man who touches her, making him undesirable, too. In 
the process of sating male desire through physical, sexual contact, she transfers 
to the male consumer a freight that threatens his body, virtue, and privileged 
status. 
To the extent that these sorts of stories continue to circulate in our cultural 
conceptions of gender, sexuality, and prostitution, they help explain why we 
continue to criminalize prostitution, despite the powerful arguments from 
feminism, libertarianism, and sex-progressivism that the act of prostitution 
itself should not be a crime. In addition, they may also help explain the riddle 
this Article addresses—the divergent treatment of prostitution and 
pornographic acting. 
3. The Virtues of Pornography 
Despite our cultural commitment to the satiation of male sexual desire, 
folk theories of sexuality favor criminalizing prostitution because those 
theories see prostitution as threatening to contaminate male consumers not just 
physically but morally and socially. Pornography, in contrast, does not pose 
the same threat of taint and corruption to the male consumer that prostitution 
does, and it is therefore a less costly means of fulfilling the cultural 
commitment to satiation of male sexual desire. For this reason, folk theories of 
sexuality favor privileging pornography over prostitution, and thus help 
explain the law’s divergent treatment of prostitution and pornographic acting. 
From the perspective of the folk theories discussed so far, pornography 
does not threaten to taint or corrupt male consumers in the same way that 
prostitution does. This is true in several ways. 
First, pornography does not threaten to infect the male consumer’s physical 
body. When the male consumer uses pornography, he does not interact 
physically with the pornographic actor’s body. Instead, he uses an inanimate 
visual representation to construct an imaginative representation. As a result, 
the pornographic actor cannot transmit disease to the male consumer. There is 
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no danger that his body will be harmed by his engagement with the 
pornography she produces. 
Second, pornography does not threaten the same sort of moral corruption 
that prostitution does. This is not to say that pornography has been or is 
morally approved. On the contrary, there have long been narratives, associated 
with fundamentalist morality and sexual conservativism, condemning 
consumption of pornography as spiritually warping. Likewise, some influential 
feminists and psychologists have contended that consumption of pornography 
has perverting psychological effects, generating violent, anti-social, and/or 
unrealistic sexual tastes, fantasies, and behaviors. These stories echo stories of 
prostitution’s morally corrupting character. Nevertheless, pornography has 
generally not been seen as presenting the same threat of moral taint or 
corruption that prostitution does. Popular morality typically draws an 
important distinction between acts and thoughts/fantasies, attaching much 
greater moral weight to immoral acts than to fantasies and thoughts about 
immoral acts. An act cannot be undone, we say, but thoughts can be buried or 
forgotten. We say that we do not punish people for dreams, fantasies, and 
thoughts, and that dreams, fantasies, and thoughts are not crimes. Indeed, the 
punishment of “thought crimes” was one of the startling and dismaying 
features of Orwell’s seminal dystopia, and popular anxiety about hate crimes 
often casts such crimes as improperly punishing thoughts. To the extent that 
use of pornography is understood as an imaginative or otherwise intellectual 
phenomenon, then, it is not surprising that pornography use is not perceived as 
implicating the user’s moral character to the same extent that patronizing a 
prostitute is. We do not see such imaginative and intellectual activity as 
involving the same degree of commitment or investment, and thus we do not 
see it tainting us the way that acts do. 
Third, pornography does not threaten to taint or corrupt the user socially. 
The pornographic actor may be as fallen and degraded as the prostitute, but the 
consumer of pornography does not associate directly with the pornographic 
actor. There is therefore no danger that that pornographic actor’s degraded 
status will “rub off” on the consumer—no taint by association, no transmission 
of degradation through sexually charged touch. 
Nor does the user of pornography cede power to the pornographic actor. 
Though the pornography may contribute to intense physical and psychological 
experiences like those the client experiences with the prostitute, the 
pornographic actor does not exercise any control over or power through those 
experiences. The pornographic actor is not present, and thus cannot direct the 
consumer’s intense feelings and experiences. Indeed, the pornographic actor is 
not aware that the user is having those feelings and experiences, and thus can 
take no benefit from them whatsoever. Thus, pornography sates male desire 
without appearing to subject the male consumer to the control or power of the 
pornographic actor. In this way, it insulates the user from any degradation that 
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might flow from submission or vulnerability to a socially degraded 
pornographic actor.138 
Nor does pornography induce the male consumer to engage in conduct 
incompatible with favored social roles and stereotypical assumptions the way 
the client of the prostitute does. He does not, for example, engage in conduct 
that is commonly construed as marriage- and family-threatening infidelity. 
Rather, on the common narrative, the pornography user’s spouse may (or may 
not) be upset by the use of pornography; but such narratives do not normally 
present the pornography use as grounds for ending the marriage. Thus, unlike 
patronizing a prostitute, using pornography is not seen as a fatal offense 
against a marriage, and engagement with a prostitute is a more potent threat to 
the man’s occupation of the privileged social roles of husband and father than 
use of pornography. 
Thus, on common cultural narratives, prostitution and pornographic acting 
differ fundamentally in their capacities to contaminate the consuming male. 
Because prostitution involves direct physical, sexual contact between the 
consuming male and the prostitute, it poses a serious threat of physical, moral, 
and social corruption. In contrast, because the user of pornography never has 
any sort of direct contact with the pornographic actor, pornographic acting 
does not pose a similar threat to taint or corrupt the consumer. While the 
consumer’s use of pornography may still be morally disapproved and 
criticized, the threat to the consumer is qualitatively different than that faced 
by the prostitute’s client. 
In this sense, folk theories of gender and sex see prostitution and acting in 
pornography very differently. While both have the virtue of fulfilling the 
cultural commitment to satiating male sexual desire, only pornography has the 
virtue of doing so without threatening the physical, moral, and social 
contamination of the male consumer. From the perspective of these folk 
theories then, it makes sense to punish prostitution while allowing 
pornographic acting. 
Of course, even pornographic acting does require sexual contact between a 
man and a woman, and thus it seems to involve the same potential for male 
contamination through sexual contact with a woman. It might seem that folk 
theory (and law) should therefore condemn pornographic acting, too. But while 
pornographic acting might appear to threaten the pornographic actor’s partner 
the same way that prostitution threatens the prostitute’s client, this threat is 
largely invisible in cultural narratives about pornography. 
There are several possible explanations for this threat’s invisibility. The 
most likely is that the male partner in pornography is seen as already fallen or 
 
 138. MacKinnon, Pornography, supra note 1, at 997 (noting that in pornography, “[t]hat the 
sexually used are transported on paper on celluloid or digitally may make the transaction seem 
more distanced”).  
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contaminated at the outset. The male partner is, after all, a pornographic actor, 
too. He has already foresworn the physical, moral, and social purity of the 
“respectable” citizen. As a result, nothing is gained by protecting him from 
contamination through sexual contact with the female pornographic actor. 
From the perspective of folk theory, he is not worthy of protection, and it is too 
late to save him anyway. Another explanation is that popular discourse frames 
pornography in a way that obscures the participation of the male pornographic 
actor. That discourse typically frames pornography as presenting objectified 
women to be consumed by male viewers—focusing on the victimization or 
promiscuity of the actress, and the misogyny or lust of the male consumer—
with the male actor dropping entirely out of the discussion. Finally, lack of 
concern for the male pornographic actor may reflect a cultural willingness to 
“sacrifice” a small number of men—exposing them to threats of physical, 
moral, and social taint and corruption—in service to a mechanism that can sate 
the desires of large numbers of men without threatening to taint or corrupt 
them. That is, folk thinking may be willing to overlook the potential 
contamination of the male pornographic actor because the ratio of men 
contaminated to men satiated is much smaller in an instance of pornographic 
acting than it is in prostitution. 
 * * * * * 
The answer to this Article’s riddle, then, is that the critical difference 
between prostitution and pornographic acting lies in their perceived capacities 
to corrupt the men who consume them. As we have seen, there are many 
plausible arguments for criminalizing prostitution but nearly all would also 
mandate criminalizing pornography. And, as we have seen, there are plausible 
rationales for decriminalizing pornographic acting but nearly all would also 
mandate decriminalizing prostitution. In order to explain the law we have, 
then, we need another sort of explanation, one that can account for both the 
criminalization of prostitution and the decriminalization of pornographic 
acting. 
We can find such an explanation in our culture’s folk theories about 
sexuality, and especially in the interaction between our cultural commitment to 
sating male desire and our cultural anxiety about the ways in which direct 
physical, sexual contact with a woman may taint or corrupt the man who 
engages in that contact. Despite the increasing influence of feminism, 
libertarianism, and sex-progressivism in popular thinking about sex, then, the 
law governing these vices remains stubbornly attached to what seem like 
archaic and superstitious attitudes about sexuality—attitudes that are on the 
one hand preoccupied with male interests and on the other hand fearfully 
superstitious about what happens when men and women come into physical 
contact. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Under the conventional legal definition of prostitution, when A has sex 
with B because B pays A to have sex with B, A commits prostitution. The 
same standard definition mandates that when A has sex with B because a third 
party pays A and B to have sex with each other in order to make a 
pornographic picture or film, A commits prostitution. Nevertheless, many 
popular and legal authorities hold that pornographic acting is not prostitution, 
giving rise to the riddle that inspires this Article. 
While the courts have offered an array of justifications for this anomaly in 
the law, their justifications are unsatisfying. Classic legal moralist and harm-
oriented theories of criminalization do not do much better at making sense of 
this riddle. There is good reason to think, then, that it cannot be rationalized or 
justified. 
It can, however, be explained. As this Article has shown, this anomaly in 
the law of vice springs from the interplay between some our culture’s folk 
theories of sexuality, including theories that privilege satiation of male sexual 
desire and theories that make sexual contact with women—and especially 
women of low social status—a potential source of physical, moral, and social 
contamination for men. This is not an explanation that makes the law’s 
anomalous treatment of pornographic acting more appealing, for these folk 
theories of sexuality appear both misogynist and childishly superstitious. But 
discovering these folk theories at work in this anomaly should help us 
understand where the anomaly comes from. Moreover, in tracing the anomaly 
to such ugly roots, it provides new ammunition for discrediting and reforming 
these anomalous practices. 
In addition, though this Article has not directly addressed the long-standing 
debates about whether prostitution and pornography should be criminalized, 
the ideas developed here might also have some relevance to the criminalization 
debates. That the law’s distinction between prostitution and acting in 
pornography can be traced back to anxieties about corruption through direct 
sexual contact highlights some of the persisting preoccupations of the law of 
vice. It is a body of law that continues to be oriented to the concerns of the 
male consumers of vice, and one that continues to be shaped and moved by 
viscerally held and childlike superstitions about the dangers of sexual contact 
with the female body and the ways sex might corrupt the otherwise virtuous 
person who comes into contact with it.139 
It may be that these insights point in different directions with respect to the 
criminalization of vices like prostitution and pornography. On one side, the 
confirmation of vice-law’s preoccupation with the concerns and experiences of 
 
 139. Richards observes that legal regulation of prostitution may “rest on a residuum of quite 
primitive beliefs which we self-consciously reject elsewhere in our social life but which, in 
certain circumscribed areas, unconsciously retain their force.” Richards, supra note 4, at 1236. 
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men and the imagined threats posed by women reinforces radical feminist 
observations about the law’s persisting disdain for women and their 
experiences, and thus it supports radical feminist arguments for eradication of 
prostitution and pornography. On the other side, spotlighting vice-law’s 
superstitious anxiety about potentially charged physical contact between men 
and women might support feminist, libertarian, and sex-progressive arguments 
for jettisoning sex-restrictive laws like those governing prostitution as archaic, 
childlike, superstitious, and irrational. 
Finally, the ideas developed here may help explain why laws criminalizing 
prostitution hang on so stubbornly—not only against the steady tide 
liberalizing sex regulation generally but also in the face of the near unanimity 
among feminists (who are otherwise deeply fractured regarding prostitution) 
and others that prostitutes themselves should be seen as victims not 
perpetrators, and that prostitution should not be criminal (even if patronizing, 
pimping, and other crimes that exploit prostitution should be). If the 
prostitute’s physical engagement with the client is understood most viscerally 
to taint or corrupt the client, the prostitute is recast not as victim but as vector, 
and not as participant in a victimless crime but as the mechanism by which 
serious harm is inflicted. In other words, on this account, prostitution is not a 
vice offence at all (at least if vice is a label for victimless crimes) but 
something much worse. Again, this raises the possibility that even as feminist, 
libertarian, and sex-progressive norms continue to advance and dissolve away 
increasing swaths of traditional vice law, laws against prostitution may show 
unexpected resilience, sustained by superstitions as primitive and stubborn as 
playground myths. 
 
